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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: Computer-Based Test 
Interpretation Software: Its 
Effect on School Psychologist 
Decision Making 
John Wesley Wisor 
Doctor of Philosophy, 1989 
Dissertation directed by: William Strein 
Associate Professor 
Counseling and Personnel 
Services 
The purpose of this study was to assess the utility 
of interpretative software for school psychological 
decision making in its role as a decision aid. One 
hundred two professional school psychologists were 
provided case data and asked to make a series of 
diagnostic and prognostic decisions based on the case 
material. One subject group received case material only 
and each of the other two groups received one of two 
variations of the narrative output generated by a 
computer-based test interpretation software package in 
addition to the case material. The subjects were also 
asked which data sources were most influential as they 
made their decisions. 
Diagnostic agreement among the psychologists within 
each group was analyzed by Kendall's coefficient of 
concordance or weighted Kappa. For each decision there 
were no significant differences in agreement between 
those psychologists who had access to the decision aids 
and those who did not . Chi-square and Freidman analysis 
of variance results for sim~larity of diagnosis across 
groups were mixed with some trends ~uggestive of greater 
similarities of decisions among the subjects utilizing 
different variations of the computer output than among 
decisions made by unaided psychologists . Further the 
school psychologists overwhelmingly indicated that test 
data and behavioral observations were the most 
i nfluential data sources for their decisions and that 
computer-based data sources were the least influential . 
Also there appeared to be no significant relationship 
between school psychologist professional experience and 
the perceived influence of the case data sources as wel l 
as little relationship between degree of experience in 
using computers to the data sources considered to be 
useful in the decision making process. 
The results were discussed in terms of 
psychological decision theory . Trends in the data 
suggested the computer narrative was most effective in 
s i tuations where it was necessary to discriminate among 
ambiguous decision choices rather than in more clear cut 
situations. It was concluded that computer-based 
decision aids have the potential to debias the decision 
process, but that definitive changes will not come until 
the technology is improved and school psychologists 
become more familiar with the use of computers. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible for the behavior of a 
single, isolated individual to reach any 
high degree of rationality. The number of 
alternatives he must explore is so great, 
the information he would need to evaluate 
them is so vast that even an approximation 
to objective rationality is hard to conceive. 
(Simon, 1976 p. 23) 
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A major component of a school psychologist's 
responsibility is to administer and interpret 
psychological and educational tests for the purpose of 
assisting in the determination of eligibility for special 
education services in accordance with state and federal 
guidelines. The psychologist is bound by standards of 
ethical practice and/or statute to provide the 
information that will maximize the likelihood that each 
student evaluated will be provided that educational 
program best suited to the individual's needs. Usually 
this information is presented in the form of a written 
psychological evaluation. In practice, there tends to be 
a general dissatisfaction (Lidz, 1981) with the results 
of these evaluation reports among psychologists 
themselves and among their prime source of referrals, the 
classroom teacher. Engle (1966) suggested that school 
psychologists tend to feel uncertain about the treatment 
recommendations they have made and the general lack of a 
clear and direct relationship between data gleaned from 
the evaluation session and actual academic functioning of 
the student in question. Different theoretical 
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orientations confounded by each psychologist's 
idiosyncratic schema and knowledge base has significantly 
limited consistency of diagnostic decisions across 
students. Not only are some students being placed in 
special programs on the basis of systematic error in the 
decision making process, but their rights to equal 
protection under the law are being significantly 
compromised (Smith, 1984). 
The choices that a psychologist makes and the 
parameters surrounding those choices define the quality 
and reliability of any diagnostic decision a psychologist 
makes. Good ethical practice in test interpretation and 
decision-making appears to rest more upon the clinical 
skills of the psychologist than on any definitive 
scientific base. Although the literature is rife with 
scientific evidence and scientifically-based hypotheses 
about the meaning of particular constellations of test 
scores and clinical signs, the final interpretation of a 
given set of data depends primarily upon the manner in 
which the psychologist has integrated these findings with 
the available data. Bazerman (1984) and Simon (1976) 
have hypothesized that evaluator emotional, motivational, 
and cognitive variables actively bias the process. Given 
microcomputer-based decisions aids~ i.e. interpretative 
computer software for use by school psycholgists, it is 
now theoretically possible to change this schema in a 
manner that decreases decision bias and systematic error 
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in the decision making process. This is because computer 
software typically makes decisions in a lawful, 
consistent manner irrespective of many of these 
influences. Modifications in the decision making process 
can be made as necessary by adjusting the algorithms on 
which the software is based, but the decision process can 
not change across clients solely on the basis of 
psychologist variables. 
Considered together with the labor and time-saving 
aspects of automation and the increasing pressures to put 
microcomputers in every school across the nation, a move 
towards the active use of microcomputers as decision aids 
by psychologists is inevitable and is beginning to take 
place. As with most new forms of technology, however, it 
is very easy for rapidly rising expectations and positive 
face validity to obscure the need for sufficient study 
prior to implementation. Kaufman (1979), Matarazzo 
(1983), and others have argued that computerization is 
antithetical to the assessment process. Their concerns 
are based not so much on definitive evidence, but perhaps 
understandably on the implied threat to the humanity of 
the process and to a perceived subsequent increase in 
interpretive error. Somehow it is less difficult to 
rationalize human error than it is to rationalize machine 
error. Similarly, Gutkin and Ework (1985) have suggested 
that instead of decreasing errors in decision making; the 
computer has the potential to exacerbate the 
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uncertainties of data that are already uncertain by 
encouraging decision making on the basis of greater 
amounts of uncertain information. Others (McDermott, 
1982b; Murphy, 1987) are more optimistic. The American 
Psychological Association's (1986) Guidelines for 
Computer-Based Tests and Interpretations have made a 
beginning attempt to address these issues by specifying 
that " ... Psychologists offering scoring and 
interpretation services are able to produce appropriate 
evidence for the validity of the programs and procedures 
in arriving at interpretations" (p. 15). Therefore the 
use of any decision aid can only be ethically justified 
if its use in the decision process has been validated. 
Idiosyncratic clinical interpretations and decisions 
are accepted practice in psychological assessment, but 
are difficult to evaluate. Individualized integration of 
data by a clinician inhibits definitive research by 
conceivably prescribing a separate validity study for 
each interpretive decision made by each clinician. The 
inherent unreliability and ambiguity of diagnostic 
classifications (Lanyon & Goodstein, 1971) further 
complicates any validation process. Computer-based test 
interpretation software, however, standardizes data 
integration across decisions in a manner that promotes 
rather than inhibits its study. Thus there is a dual 
opportunity to study both an emerging technology and a 
heretofore difficult to study decision making process. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study then was to assess the 
utility of interpretative software for school 
psychological decision making in its role as a decision 
aid for the practicing school psychologist. More 
specifically, representative software was evaluated with 
respect to the degree to which its uses affects decisions 
made by psychologists in their role as diagnostician. 
This investigation utilized the McDermott 
Multidimensional Assessment of Children (McDermott & 
Watkins, 1985) software because it utilizes psychological 
test and diagnostic data from several sources that are 
typically used by a psychologist in the course of a 
psychological evaluation. It is chosen also because it 
represents a new generation of interpretative software 
because of its use of several data sources and its 
general availability. Also it was chosen because it was 
designed to overcome many of the biases inherent in 
psychological decision making through a utilization of 
decision matrices that were hoped by the authors to 
become a defacto standard for diagnostic decisions made 
by practicing school psychologists. 
Hypotheses 
1. Diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who 
use computer-based decision aids is significantly higher 
than diagnostic agreement of school psychologists who do 
not use computer-based decision aids. 
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2. Diagnostic decisions made by school psychologists on 
the basis of different applications of the same computer-
based decision aid will be more similar to each other 
than to those diagnostic decisions made by school 
psychologists not utilizing computer-based decision aids . 
Supplemental Questions 
1. For each of the three conditions, which data sources 
are the most influential in the decision making process 
of the practicing school psychologist? 
2. What is the relationship between school 
psychologists' professional experience level and degree 
of experience with using computers in clinical practice 
to the sources of information which they find most 
influential in the diagnostic decision making process? 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Scope and Focus 
Choices and decisions are made every day by every 
individual. The decision process is central to the 
typical activities of the school psychologist. Recent 
surveys (Ellis & Ray, 1983; McCullough & Olson, 1982) 
noted that practicing school psychologists typically 
spend approximately 40% to 70% of their working hours in 
the assessment and evaluation of referred students. Each 
referral typically calls for several judgments on the 
part of the psychologist. In most cases the psychologist 
is called upon to render a diagnostic judgement relevant 
to one or more educationally handicapping conditions as 
specified by state statute and federal law. 
Retrospectively many of these decisions will appear to 
have been valid or of good quality and others not as 
valid or good. 
This review of the literature will address how 
decisions are made by school psychologists and how those 
decisions might be improved. More specifically, school 
psychologist decision making will be defined in terms of 
psychological decision theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 
1973; Kozielecki, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1980); 
a theory of decision behavior directly relevant to the 
practicing school psychologist. Decisions will be 
examined in terms of the manner in which they are made, 
their validity and reliability, factors which determine 
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their outcome, and how the decisions might be improved 
through the use of decision aids such as computer-based 
test interpretation (CBTI) software (Fowler, Finkelstein, 
& Penk, 1986). Ancillary decision theories and 
information from other disciplines will be addressed only 
as they directly relate to a fuller understanding of the 
decisions made by school psychologists in the course of 
day to day practice. 
The Decision Process 
Background Information 
The ethical, professional, and legal importance of 
these decisions has been the basis of a large body of 
research that has attempted to determine the validity and 
reliability of the decisions that school psychologists 
and other mental health or educational professionals make 
on a daily basis. The literature is beset by a number of 
basic research issues that have not yet been adequately 
addressed. These include generalizability of samples 
chosen for investigation, the problem of statistical 
versus practical significance of decisions made, errors 
in the computation or use of statistics and problems of 
definition and clarity of diagnostic terms (Garfield, 
1978; McDermott, 1982b; Spitzer, Endicott, Cohen, & 
Fleiss, 1974). In spite of these difficulties the 
available research has concluded (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1978; Peterson & Hart, 1978; McDermott, 1982b) there is 
a general lack of significant classification congruence 
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or consistency among the decisions offered by school 
psychologists and other mental health and educational 
professionals. There are also significant differences in 
the manner in which different school psychologists 
integrate the available data prior to making a decision 
(Gredler, 1986; Klett & Pumroy, 1971; Rassen, 1979) . 
These results are, according to McDermott, a direct 
function of several factors including the incompatibility 
of available classificatory criteria, the absence of 
universally accepted standards for diagnostic decision 
making and deliberate or inadvertent noncompliance with 
existing standards. 
Approaches to the Decision Process 
overview 
There are many approaches to the decision making 
process and nearly as many hypotheses that attempt to 
explain why human judgments are often fallible and 
subject to inconsistency and bias. These types of 
conclusions have been consistently reported in the 
literature since Meehl's (1954) classic paper which 
concluded that statistical methods of decision making 
were superior to clinical decision making methods . Each 
approach to decision making is intimately tied to the 
philosophy and assumptions of the discipline from which 
it evolved. The vast majority of the research in 
dec i sion processes has been discipline-specific and 
completed in relative isolation with only moderate 
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regard to research in other fields (Anderson, Deane , 
Hammond, & McClelland, 1981). Ambiguities and other 
inconsistencies in terminology across fields of study 
further complicate integration of decision research and 
as yet have precluded any comprehensive integration of 
the many approaches (Hammond, McClelland & Mumpower , 
1980) . 
Hammond et al (1980), however, were able to 
delineate two major categories of decision theories, 
prescriptive decision theories and descriptive decision 
theories. Prescriptive theories such as generic decision 
theory (Keeny & Raffia, 1976) prescribe what the decision 
process is to be if it is rational and lawful. According 
to generic decision theory and its variants, choices of 
alternatives in a decision are a function of the 
probability of the occurrence of the alternative as well 
as the utility or usefulness of the alterative to the 
decision maker. The remaining theories, including 
psychological decision theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a), are not concerned with prescriptions of what the 
decision process should be at all, but are wholly 
concerned with describing the process in terms of the 
effect of cognitive, environmental, and social factors 
that influence the decision making process. 
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Psychological Decision Theory 
Background. Psychological decision theory (PDT) 
approaches to decision making attempt to explain errors 
made by human decision makers in terms of how probability 
estimates of alternatives under consideration are 
influenced by contextual factors. PDT further offers 
suggestions as to how the errors can be corrected. 
Persistent use is made of psychological, in contrast to 
statistical, concepts to explain the departure of the 
probability estimates of human decision makers from 
optimality. PDT holds that the decision task is strongly 
influenced by the external environment, the task itself, 
and by the cognitive system of the decision maker 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). The decision making 
environment is considered to be multidimensional with 
varying and simultaneous dimensions of uncertainty and 
complexity which affect the ultimate decision made. 
The decision maker is faced with a given amount of 
data that needs to be integrated or reconciled in some 
manner that optimizes the validity and reliability of the 
decision to be made. The efficacy of the decision made 
is partially a function of the manner in which the 
decision maker structures the problem and defines the 
data that is or is not relevant to the situation. 
According to Feldman's (1981) perspective to 
psychological decision making, people apparently do not 
necessarily accurately respond to the content of a 
I~-------------------------------------------
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communication automatically. Instead they respond 
initially in terms of prepackaged stereotypes or 
categories whose accuracy is unchallenged until the 
incoming information reaches some hypothetical threshold 
of discrepancy with the stereotype. Similarly, Mischel's 
(1969) approach to personality assessment asserts that 
judgments of human personality are a function of the 
decision maker's perceptions with the human mind 
functioning " ... like an extraordinarily effective 
reducing valve that creates and maintains the perception 
of continuity even in the face of perceptual (sic) 
observed changes in actual behavior ... " (p. 101- 102) . 
People seem to begin with complex explanations for 
behavior and eliminate potential causes as the evidence 
warrants. 
Heuristics are cognitive rules of thumb for 
simplifying complex problems in a manner that increases 
the probability that a solution will be found within a 
reasonable amount of time (Anderson et al 1981). 
According to psychological decision theory, heuristics 
fundamentally influence the ultimate choices that a 
decision maker will make (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
1982a). "The impossibility of having complete, reliable, 
predictable information about people and social 
interactions suggests that people adopt heuristics that 
enable them to make inferences and predictions from what 
13 
scanty and unreliable data are available" (Taylor, 1982 
p. 191). It appears that once an uncertain situation has 
been perceived or interpreted in a given fashion, it is 
quite difficult to see it in another fashion as other 
interpretations of the situation are inhibited. 
Kaplan (1975) explains this phenomenon in terms of 
the decision maker vis a vis the stimulus data on which 
the decision will ultimately be based. He cites four 
potential avenues through which individual differences 
across decision makers can be expressed. Judges differ 
in their valuation of a particular datum. Different 
judges differ in the conclusions that they draw on the 
basis of identical data and people are different in the 
manner in which they integrate the available information. 
Finally decision makers are described as demonstrating 
differences in pre-existing response dispositions to 
clients or data. In practice these differences relate to 
one's ability to arrive at integrated impressions from 
(often) inconsistent information, one's susceptibility to 
order effects and rigidity of first impression, and one's 
ability to differentiate among stimuli. These effects 
diminish with increased amounts of nonredundant 
information and increased importance of information for 
judgment. In the school psychology literature, Rassen 
(1979) analyzed the decisions made by school 
psychologists on student case data and noted some similar 
effects. She concluded that prescriptive and diagnostic 
14 
decisions were influenced by the nature of the judgement 
task and the salience of different diagnostic or 
remedial alternatives under consideration. 
The availability heuristic. Research has suggested 
the existence of two major heuristics; the availability 
heuristic and the representativeness heuristic. 
The availability heuristic (Nisbett, Borgida, 
Crandall, & Reed, 1982; Taylor, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman 
1974) is a cognitive mechanism whereby individuals assess 
the frequency of a class or the probability of an event 
by the ease with which instances or occurrences come to 
mind. The affective strength or salience of data can 
increase the availability of data for consideration and 
therefore the subjective probability that a given 
decision alternative will be made (Kirsch & Ford, 1986; 
Kozielecki, 1975). Subjective data is more salient and 
more easily recalled than drier, less affectively-laden 
data and therefore more available to the decision maker 
in the decision process. For example, a suggestion that 
a child "may have been sexually abused" is more likely to 
be remembered than is the child's mid-range scores on a 
personality inventory. 
The referral data that a psychologist receives prior 
to an evaluation varies in its subjectivity and affective 
salience. The content of this data has been shown to 
have a significant effect on the final decisions made 
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often irrespective of other pertinent case information 
according to conclusions drawn by Cummings et al (1986); 
Elders, (1977); Huebner, (1987); Huebner & Cummings 
(1985); Knoff, (1984); McCoy (1976); Ysseldyke & 
Algozzine (1981) and Zinman (1983). This occurrence is 
particularly apparent when the diagnostic categories are 
as Huebner suggests "difficult and ambiguous" and include 
the commonly applied handicapping classifications of 
"behavior disorder," "emotionally disturbed," and to a 
less consistent extent "learning disabled." The concept 
of "learning disabled," although considered to be very 
ambiguous in the literature and subject to inconsistent 
application (Dawson, 1985; Kovaleski, 1985; Ysseldyke & 
Algozzine, 1981), is generally determined with the aid of 
one of several ability-achievement formulas (MacMann, 
1985). It . is therefore probably somewhat less 
susceptible to the subjective and affectively-laden 
referral information phenomena than the other less 
clearly defined diagnoses. Nonetheless Kovaleski 
considers the learning disability decision process to 
involve a "confounding and confusing morass" that has 
not been adequately delineated and has not been 
empirically proven. 
Information easily retrieved from memory will also 
be more available to the decision maker than data not as 
readily retrieved (Kozielecki, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982a) . It is hypothesized that a clinician, when 
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presented with case data, will scan his/her memory to 
recall cases similar to the client being evaluated. Here 
the subjective probability of the new client being 
diagnosed the same as similar clients in memory would 
depend upon the similarity between the cases as well as 
the strength of any other heuristic operating at the same 
time. Further, data points that have been more recently 
examined are more available and therefore more likely to 
influence a decision. Feldman (1981) states that 
decision making typically takes place in an 
i nformationally "noisy" environment where impressions and 
evaluations are formed as behavior is observed 
sequentially. The final judgments made are based as 
much, or more, on what is then available in current 
memory storage than upon other less available stored 
information. In a variation on this effect, Knoff (1980) 
found the order of presentation of student data 
i nfluenced school psychologist and special education 
trainee and practitioner placement decisions. 
The representativeness heuristic. People often make 
decisions on the basis of information that has little to 
do with the statistical probability of something 
occurring but on the basis of its subjective probability; 
i.e. the outcome that is most representative of or 
similar to the input data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 
1974 , 1982a) . The subjective probability of the event is 
judged by the degree to which the event is similar to its 
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parent population or reflects the features of the process 
by which it was generated. In the case of the school 
psychologist the child who is referred as "disruptive" is 
likely to be considered educationally handicapped even 
though the probability the child is truly handicapped is 
low compared to the probability that the child is normal. 
This ordering of events by their subjective probabilities 
coincides with their ordering by representativeness. 
The tendency of decision makers to neglect or 
misinterpret base rate information through the operation 
of the representativeness heuristic (Bar-Hillel, 1982; 
Litchenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; 
Lyon & Slavic, 1976) is enhanced by any factor that 
increases the perceived uniqueness of the case 
information. Bar-Hillel (1980) concluded people order 
decision-relevant information according to perceived 
degree of relevance. Empirical research and probability 
distributions associated with the particular case in 
question is generally perceived as less relevant because 
it may be perceived as merely coincidental or of low 
relevance compared to more specific, causal, high 
relevance information. The high relevance, more 
affectively laden information will then be considered to 
be more representative of the case. This systematic bias 
will enter into the final decision made to the general 
exclusion of empirical data. 
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When special education teachers were asked to 
analyze objectively defined trends in student performance 
(Utley, Zigmond, & Strain, 1987), those teachers who 
utilized observational methods made significantly 
different and less accurate trend analyses than those 
teachers using varying levels of base-rate data in 
addition to the observations. Had the subjects utilized 
the generally correct base-rate information instead of 
observational data that was readily representative in the 
situation and had they applied that information correctly 
to the specific cases presented; their conclusions would 
have been more accurate. Even when subjects were given 
probability statements describing the base rates for 
decisions to be made (Tver$ky & Kahneman, 1973) a 
significant number of ultimate decisions ignored the 
base rate data in favor of data biased by 
representativeness. Further, Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, 
and Fong (1982) found that people showed no systematic 
differences in decisions made on the basis of "obviously" 
haphazardly sampled information versus more standard data 
samples. Apparently when specific information is 
available the representative heuristic frequently 
precludes from consideration prior base-rate defined 
probabilities that are necessarily the best predictors 
available. 
The major difference between availability and 
representativeness is that availability evaluates the 
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subjective probability of an outcome by how difficult i t 
i s to retrieve or construct from memory. 
Representativeness, however, evaluates subjective 
probability by the degree of correspondence between the 
available data and the population at large. The 
representativeness heuristic is therefore more likely to 
be employed when data is characterized in terms of 
general probabilities whereas the availability heuristic 
is more likely to be employed when events are "more 
naturally thought of in terms of specific occurrences" 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), Because both heuristics 
operate simultaneously on the same data sources in real 
time decision making it is often difficult to ascertain 
which of the two heuristics is primarily operational a t 
any given instant. 
The Decision Making Process 
How are Decisions Made? 
Decision making in humans is best described in terms 
of an interplay of cognitive mechanisms of varying 
strength and operation that together determine the 
factors that are considered by the decision maker and the 
eventual decision outcome. Each theory of decision 
making and its variants are different, but there is 
general agreement on how decisions should optimally be 
made. According to Bazerman (1984), Hammond et al 
( 1981), and Janis & Mann (1977) an optimal decision is 
made in terms of a standard of rational comparison where 
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the decision maker combines, aggregates, or organizes the 
probabilities and utilities associated with various 
decision alternatives. Decisions made by school 
psychologists are apparently made in a similar fashion 
according to a study by Scherphorn (1979). He concluded 
that school psychologists typically generate a large 
number of hypotheses and eliminate alternatives as more 
data is analyzed. Then they tend to test their 
diagnostic hypotheses with additional information and 
continue to collect data until a recognizable pattern 
occurs. He found that his subjects needed as few as four 
sources of data before making a first statement of what 
was later to become a final diagnosis, although they used 
eight to ten additional pieces of data as supporting 
evidence before finalizing the decision. A similar study 
by McDermott (1975) suggested similar processes. 
In making a decision one evaluates information that 
in turn forms the basis of alternative courses of action 
or choices. The alternative with the highest "subjective 
expected utility" (Fishburn, 1972) or preference is the 
alternative that is normally chosen as the ultimate 
decision. Under optimal conditions the process occurs as 
just described. The actions of individuals, however, are 
rarely completely rational and so these optimal decision 
processes do not necessarily mimic actual human decision 
processes. Instead they are influenced in a very direct 
way by heuristics. 
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Although little is known about why heuristics 
survive in light of frequent error and contradictory 
evidence, Nisbett & Ross (1980) stated that individuals 
tend to use and see those covariations and patterns of 
learning their own specific history of learning disposes 
them to see. People make sense out of their world by the 
learning of causal relationships and the organization of 
events into "causal schema" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). 
Statistical probabilities relevant to day to day 
decisions are not learned from everyday experience 
because the relevant experiences are not coded 
appropriately nor is feedback on the validity of the 
decisions frequently available. Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to objectively discriminate among decision 
alternatives; necessitating the ill-advised use of 
particular heuristics and other potentially biasing 
judgment procedures. Bazerman (1984) stated that 
individuals have a tendency to ignore disconfirming 
information because it is usually easier to find 
supporting information for a given decision. People also 
tend to escalate commitment to a previously selected 
course of action to a point beyond that which a rational 
model of decision making would prescribe. It is 
generally felt the principles that people tend to adopt 
represent significant beliefs that play a substantial 
role in retarding the learning of correct rules. 
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Decision makers are hindered as well (Bazerman, 
1984; Feldman, 1981) by the time and search costs 
necessary to get what they believe is sufficient 
information to make what Reitman (1984) considers to be 
an "ill-defined" psychological decision that does not 
have an explicit criterion or set of unvarying variables. 
For school psychologists at the mercy of heavy caseloads, 
daily time constraints, and the necessity to compile 
student information of various and or unknown validities 
from many sources, it is not surprising that time and 
search costs are often compromised in the interest of 
servicing the student in a timely manner. Accordingly 
(Simon, 1976), a decision maker who tries as best as 
possible to make a good optimizing decision ends up with 
an often unsatisfactory suboptimized solution. The 
solution is one that maximizes some of the utilities that 
were expected to be gained at the expense of losing other 
utilities. Simon argues that the decision maker 
"satisfices, 11 rather than maximizes; i.e. searches for a 
course of action that is "good enough" (frequently a 
heuristic) that meets a minimal set of requirements. 
This use of "bounded" rationality allows individuals to 
resort to gross simplifications for dealing with complex 
decision problems that may or may not yield optimally 
valid or reliable results. 
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Clinical versus Statistical Decision Making 
Generally speaking, the psychologist, as a trained 
professional, has the latitude to make diagnostic 
decisions in any manner and, within reason, with any data 
sources that appear to be situationaly appropriate and 
within accepted ethical and legal standards. Typically 
the school psychologist makes decisions in an intuitive, 
"clinical" manner that considers student data in the 
context of the practitioner's training and experience. 
Less frequently, the psychologist will use one or more 
decision aids, i.e. formalized (statistical) predictor 
equations, computer-based test interpretive programs, or 
similar computer-based resources to assist in the 
decision making process as ethical guidelines (American 
Educational Research Association [AERAJ, American 
Psychological Association [APA], & National Council on 
Measurement in Education [NCMEJ, 1985; APA, 1986) 
prohibit decision making solely on the basis of actuarial 
or machine processes. According to Meehl (1954), 
intuitive or clinical decision making is a process 
whereby the decision maker, on the basis of available 
data, formulates a hypothesis, relates a hypothesis to 
the subjective probabilities of events that are related 
to the situation and then arrives at a prediction or 
decision about what is expected to happen. Actuarial or 
statistical prediction, on the other hand, uses 
codifiable or quantifiable data input measures and 
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mechanically combines it according to a predefined 
(usually statistical) formula (Sawyer, 1966). Usually 
the decisions are described in terms of probability 
statements. These and other techniques reported in the 
literature include regression analyses (Dawes, 1982; 
Grebstein, 1963), configural analyses (Wiggins & Hoffman, 
1968), heiarchial cluster analysis (Cleary, Humphreys, 
Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975), principle components varimax 
analysis (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978), multiple 
discriminant function analysis (Petersen & Hart, 1978; 
Sichel, 1982) and systems actuarial procedures (McDermott 
& Watkins, 1985). 
On the basis of a review of several empirical 
studies that compared clinical decision making with 
decisions made on the basis of statistical or other 
formalized procedures, Meehl (1954) concluded that 
statistical procedures were approximately equal or 
superior to those made by a clinician with respect to 
comparisons made against a predefined standard or 
criterion. These studies generated many other studies, 
the majority of which tended to confirm Meehl's general 
conclusions (Goldberg, 1959, 1968; Grebstein, 1963; Hill 
et al, 1978; Lyle & Quast, 1976; Peterson & Hart, 1978; 
Sawyer, 1966). It was further suggested that those valid 
instances of clinical judgment, where they existed, could 
be largely duplicated by mechanical combination such as 
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by a simple regression equation (Dawes, 1982; Goldberg, 
1970; Hill et al, 1978). 
According to Dawes (1982) these types of linear 
models work well because decision makers are generally 
good at picking out the right predictor variables and 
coding them but they are not as good when it comes to 
integrating the data because of the strength of 
heuristics and other biasing influences. He described a 
series of studies in which predictions of school success 
were made by a variety of subjects. The actual ratings 
made were objective and thus could be validated based on 
actual data. Several statistical and random models of 
the judges' decisions were then developed and the same 
predictions were made once again. In general, all of the 
derived models had a higher validity than the predictions 
made by the human judges, 
In the Peterson & Hart (1978) study, a retrospective 
multiple discriminant function analysis of school 
psychologists' clinical decisions concluded that the 
variables of Full Scale IQ and student race accounted for 
almost as much of the differences between all 
psychologically-defined federally designated 
educationally handicapping conditions (diagnoses) than 
did the entire set of all other available data sources. 
Dewitte (1976) found similar evidence of decision bias by 
school psychologists with respect to socioeconomic status 
of school children. In the case of the diagnoses of 
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"learning disability" and "seriously emotionally 
disturbed" federal regulations (United States Off i ce of 
Education, 1977) require that data from many data sources 
(excluding race and socioeconomic status) be an implici t 
part of the definition. The authors concluded that the 
learning disabled and seriously emotionally disturbed 
diagnoses were completed in a "completely inferential" 
manner that did not take into consideration the many 
appropriate data sources considered to be an implicit 
part of the diagnoses rendered. Similarly, DSM III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) diagnoses and 
similar, ICD-9 (World Health Organization, 1978) 
diagnostic reliabilities only approximate 60-67% 
(Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978); again indicating 
significant inconsistency in diagnosis across clinicians . 
Classification itself involves establishing orderly 
relationships among individuals according to similarities 
or specified attributes. Empirical classification 
methods can be used to identify subgroups of highly 
similar cases and by inference to define the number and 
nature of underlying disorders. Nonempirical methods can 
only approximate these relationships because of 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the classification 
system and the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
classify a set of social behaviors or feelings into a 
discretely defined set of diagnostic parameters. 
Therefore, the reliability and validity of current 
classification practices (McDermott, 1982b) are 
necessarily compromised. Meehl (1954) stated (p. 130) 
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••• no set of percentile ranks, no graphical 
representations of personality components, and no 
paragraph of characterological descriptions can contain 
all of the richness of our immediate experience." It i s 
apparent that this richness of immediate experience has a 
dual effect that both enhances the apparent quality and 
validity of clinical judgment, while at the same time 
introduces systematic biases that scientifically and 
ethically should not exist. Achenbach and Edelbrock 
(1978) were more pragmatic . in their observations and 
asserted that "shot-gun approach[es)" to decision making 
were unacceptable for professional practice. They called 
instead for "sophisticated strategies of data reduction 
and analysis" to assure better service provision for 
individuals evaluated. 
Decision Improvement Strategies 
Noncomputer-aided. Academic credentials and 
experience variables do not seem to improve the quality 
and consistency of the clinical decisions made 
(Grebstein, 1963; Goldberg, 1968; Wiggins, 1973) or in 
the susceptibility of the decisions to outside influences 
unrelated to the case data (Temerlin, 1968). Instead it 
seems to be necessary to provide training in strategies 
of decision improvement (Bazerman, 1984). The first of 
these are so-called debiasing strategies. As a goal, 
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they operate to improve the permanent quality of an 
individual's intuition through a personal change process . 
Through personal change and a knowledge of potential 
decision biases, the trained decision maker is supposed 
to make less biased decisions. Essentially, deci sion 
makers are warned about the possibility of bias, the 
direction of the bias is described, and the decision 
maker is given both immediate and followup feedback 
regarding the accuracy of decisions made. Both Fischoff 
(1977) and Lichtenstein et al (1978) have shown, 
however, that even when biases are explicitly described 
to individuals and they are asked to avoid them, the 
biases are still demonstrated. 
Use of decision analysis techniques have also been 
suggested as an alternate procedure to the more 
comprehensive debiasing training just described . Their 
primary objective is to make a rational and systematic 
decision in each unique situation encountered as compared 
with more generalized behavior changes that occur as a 
result of effective debiasing training. This apparently 
is accomplished through means of ample time, ample 
resources, and "sophistication" in decision analytic 
techniques which necessitate the explicit utilization of 
probability and utility theory (Ginsberg, 1972). 
Although Bazerman (1984) and others find merit in this 
technique, it is generally concluded (Friedman, Howell & 
Jensen, 1985) there is not enough information available 
on human cognitive processes to determine what a given 
decision maker's limitations are, how many of the basic 
cognitive processes actually occur in any particular 
decision problem, or how such processes act to affect 
system output. Until these processes are better 
understood, attempts to train individuals to make more 
consistent and less biased decisions will remain of 
limited utility. 
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Statistical/computerized decision aids. Bazerman 
(1984) and Hill et al (1978) strongly indicated that the 
use of actuarially-based or statistical decision models 
can significantly improve decision making strategies over 
those which are unaided. These models may circumvent 
many of the difficulties encountered when one attempts to 
change human decision making behavior through training. 
Shanteau (1978) categorically stated that if humans 
cannot be trained to avoid biases in decision making , 
then computers should become directly involved in the 
decision process. current ethical guidelines are not 
generally supportive of the use of computer-based 
decision making procedures without concomitant review of 
any decision made by a trained professional. Ultimately, 
automated decision making methods must then be considered 
to be decision or judgement aids as no decision made is 
acceptable without human review. 
Given the recent widespread availability of 
microcomputers, it is has become possible for the 
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mathematical operations and data transformations of 
actuarial decision making to be handled relatively 
painlessly in the course of the decision process. Often 
subjective information can be transformed into typically 
nominal or ordinal scaled data that can be integrated 
within the constraints of mathematical computations. 
Compilations of statistical equations utilized in this 
way are most accurately termed decision aids (Hammond et 
al, 1980) or decision support systems (Bennett, 1983) 
because they address themselves to the cognitive needs of 
the decision maker after acquisition of data. 
Computer-based test interpretation software is a 
type of automated decision aid available for use by 
school psychologists. These function to assist the 
decision maker in the assignment of correct probabilities 
to various decision outcomes or alternatives. In the 
case of the school psychologist, they help determine 
probabilities related to the determination of diagnoses 
or intervention recommendations. They support rather 
than replace the decision maker and focus on improving 
the effectiveness of decisions made rather that just 
their efficiency. In decision support systems the goal 
is to increase the decision maker's ability to deal with 
complexity and uncertainty. Nonetheless, because 
decision rules and the models upon which they were 
developed vary from system to system program, users are 
expected to apply their own clinical judgement on how the 
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results of the software analysis should be applied to the 
decisions they are attempting to make (Brantley, 1984). 
Any computerized diagnostic system is defined by its 
decision making logic. Technically two primary modes of 
decision making by computer have emerged (Miller, 1984); 
the logical decision tree method and the statistical 
method. A third mode, artificial intelligence, shows 
much promise, but because there are no systems currently 
available for use in school psychology they will not be 
further discussed. The overlap between the two primary 
modes is substantial; especially with the development of 
more technologically sophisticated software decision aids 
that utilize combinations of both modes. Statistical 
methods include those based primarily on multiple 
discriminant function analysis, Bayesian formulas, or 
other actuarial formulas. The decision tree methods are 
derived from algorithms that test input data according to 
responses to a set of predetermined binary yes or no type 
questions; each binary response branching to another 
predetermined question in a manner that eventually yields 
an overall diagnosis when the algorithm is completed. 
The object of the decision tree method is to choose the 
path between questions that will maximize the expected 
utility of the outcome. This method is analogous to the 
"cookbook" type approach used by the psychiatric 
community to make DSM III-R (APA, 1987) diagnoses. 
Advocates of this approach such as 
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Spitzer, Endicott, Cohen, and Fleiss (1974) and others 
have designed systems to render a diagnosis by having the 
computer program compare clinical descriptors or other 
input values against a predetermined standard. A 
diagnosis is generated when there is a sufficient match 
between the input data and specified criterion. 
Most interpretive software systems in use today are 
a hybrid of the decision tree and statistical methods. 
The simplest systems available are test scoring programs 
that score test protocols administered according to test 
directions. They sometimes also administer the actual 
test. output generally includes raw and adjusted scores 
and other data normally attained when a clinician scores 
a test manually. Usually the scores are given a 
descriptive interpretation on the basis of preprogrammed 
descriptive statements. Algorithms used in generating 
the descriptive statements are based both upon 
statistical methods and upon rules generated by any 
method the software author has decided upon. These types 
of programs offer reliability in their output, but their 
overall validity depends upon the validity of the 
algorithms programmed. 
Another common type of interpretive software is the 
more sophisticated clinician-modelled program. An 
example is The Kaufman Method of WISC-R Hypothesis 
Generation (Ingram, 1985) for the WISC-R. The algorithms 
that make up these programs are written in a manner that 
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the output is identical to that which a renowned expert 
(in this case Kaufman) would generate if presented with 
the same input data. They typically are based upon a 
simple linear model derived from a regression analysis of 
the clinician's decisions. 
so-called clinical actuarial programs provide 
extensive narrative descriptors and clinical hypotheses 
as output using clinical research findings based upon 
particular score patterns as well as varying amounts of 
clinical lore. Algorithm design is similar to the other 
methods and is usually a combination of statistical 
weighing schemes combined within a usually well-defined 
decision tree. There is often no attempt to integrate 
the data on the basis of available research data . 
Instead the author designs the analysis on the basis of 
his/her own unique approach to the assessment device. 
Although most of the available interpretive software 
systems integrate data from one commonly used 
standardized test, more systems are becoming available 
that analyze information from more than one source. The 
WISC-R Factor Analysis for the Apple (Lichtenwald, 1982) 
is an example of the former and uses data from the WISC-R 
only whereas the McDermott Multidimensional Assessment of 
Children (M-MAC) (McDermott & Watkins, 1985) and School 
Psychology Information Tools (Hale, 1982) integrate a 
variety of data inputs from several test and nontest 
sources . 
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Other approaches to computer-based decision aids 
have integrated a combination of interview or 
questionnaire data. These, in addition to selected test 
results and other relevant and system specific data are 
used as input to generate DSM III diagnoses and in some 
instances treatment plans. In an ongoing study of one 
such system, the DIAGNO series at the Salt Lake City, 
Utah Veterans Administration Hospital; Johnson & Johnson 
(1981) and Johnson & Williams (1975; 1980) and others 
have developed and implemented an automated assessment 
system for incoming (psychiatric) patients. Hedlund, 
Evenson, Sletter, & Cho (1980), Miller (1984), and Fowler 
(1985), reviewed these approaches in terms of assessment 
quality, diagnostic accuracy, decision making, patient 
and staff acceptance, and cost efficiency. It was 
generally concluded that the results of the automated 
system were at least equal to and often superior and more 
internally consistent than those generated in the 
traditional manner. Further, completed patient analyses 
were received twice as fast and cost half as much as the 
traditional evaluations. 
Space (1981) described advantages to the use of 
computers as decision aids because they allow the 
knowledge of the best clinicians to become more widely 
available. He stated this encourages clinical decision 
makers to be clearer in the articulation of their 
decision making rules. He also suggested that i f the 
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decision rules were to come from expert clinicians the 
hit rate of correct decisions would be maximized and well 
above that of the average clinician. Oswald (1986) added 
that interpretive software systems can help to avoid 
overclassification of individuals through their rigid and 
reliable application of decision criteria. 
Space also listed some arguments against the use of 
interpretive software as well. He indicated that because 
interpretive software systems generally approach an 
individual as a point on a continuum in comparison with 
the rest of the population, the analyses generated are 
not geared to the regularities and patterns unique to the 
individual. Therefore, clinically more idiographic 
information is lost in favor of nomothetic information. 
He also noted their use is eschewed because it is felt 
the statistical algorithms tend to result in "trivial" 
decisions such as placing an individual into a diagnostic 
category to which he/she is already known to belong. 
According to Nichols & Knoff (1977) and Sampson (1983), 
interpretive software can omit or overgeneralize 
information which confuses the decision maker to the 
point where the information is misleading or of limited 
utility. Gutkin & Elwork (1985) suggested that computer 
assistance may encourage decision making on the basis of 
greater and potentially more subject to error amounts of 
information that gives the resulting output an aura of 
objectivity "even when it is lacking." A less moderate 
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opinion (Sinnett & Albott, 1987) considered the use of 
computers in psychology to be " ... gimmicks that allow ... 
the psychologist, to avoid accountability under extant 
ethical principles" (p. 191). 
Arguments on both sides of the automation of 
psychological practice continue. There appears, however, 
to have developed a general consensus that currently 
available interpretive software products are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to make diagnostic 
decisions and instead should be used as a resource for 
the practicing psychologist 
(Jacob & Brantley, 1986; Walker & Myrick, 1985). 
According to Doll (1985) computer assistance should be 
used to support professional competence, but not extend 
it. Although interpretive software systems have many 
weakness, Murphy (1987) feels they are a valuable tool. 
Instead of questioning their use, the professional should 
begin to question the continued used of unaided clinical 
judgments as the sole source of professional diagnostic 
decisions. In a recent survey of school psychologists 
who were current microcomputer users (Brantley, Jacob, & 
Troutman, 1985) most microcomputer usage was devoted to 
statistical analyses, data storage, and word processing 
for report writing. Use of the microcomputer for test 
interpretation was only moderate in comparison. 
A decision or judgment aid must be judged in terms 
of its quality to discriminate at the boundary lines 
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where decisions are to be made (Cronbach, 1965) . When 
mathematical formulas are used as guides to policy-making 
they carry hidden value judgments that the decision maker 
might not be unwilling to accept if they were considered 
explicitly. Further, value judgments are often 
unavoidable when one attempts to quantify factors that 
have not been satisfactorily quantified by generations of 
psychologists and educators. Nonetheless one should keep 
them to a minimum to avoid inconsistencies in the overall 
decision system. Similarly Greenberg (1986) advises that 
t he results of any analysis are totally dependent upon 
the coding systems used to obtain or structure the data 
used in a decision or judgment support system. Any 
algorithm, mathematical model, or decision tree used can 
only be an approximation of the real world and 
necessarily becomes more complex and sacrifices reality 
in order to gain information and computational advantages 
to t he decision maker 
(Dyer & Mulvey 1983). 
Irregardless of their use of data and internal 
programming, computers necessarily bring structure to 
decision making (Sidowski, Johnson, & Williams, 1980) . 
Nisbet and Ross (1980) stated that machine-aiding can 
improve performance by eliminating a cognitive operation; 
i . e. the need to formulate cue values (the probable value 
of a given datum, such as a test score). They also 
hypothesized the degree of improvement that is obtained 
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through the use of a machine reflects the difficulty of 
the cognitive cue formulation activity the machine is 
performing. The harder it is for the decision maker to 
formulate cue values, the more helpful a machine would be 
that makes the cue estimation step unnecessary. 
These estimation steps, according to Simon and Reed 
(1976) reduce the decision maker's so-called problem 
space, i.e. the relative number of alternatives and data 
sources the decision maker has to choose from. In the 
case of school psychologists who were presented with a 
typical assessment problem and were provided with no 
available decision aids (Gredler, 1986) approximately 25% 
of the professionally trained school psychologists chose 
data sources that yielded a decision making "competency" 
score equivalent to that which would be attained if data 
sources would have been randomly chosen for 
consideration. Although it could be stated that 75% of 
the school psychologists made choices that improved upon 
random selection, the fact that the decision making 
competency of one in four psychologists did not improve 
upon random choice is ethically irresponsible. 
Friedman, Howell, and Jensen (1985), designed an 
automated simulation that looked at how the quality of a 
human judgment is affected by preprocessing applied to 
raw data when such processing is carried out by a human 
with or without machine aid. The authors obtained direct 
measures of estimation (decision making) performance on 
39 
varied decision tasks. Levels of mechanical aid that 
ranged from unaided decisions, as is commonly utilized i n 
clinical decision making, to a mechanical computation of 
cues important to the final decision were varied across 
type of decision task. Decision making performance 
improved systematically as the level of mechanical aid 
increased in the absence of any requirement for the 
subject to estimate cue values prior to making a 
decision. The act of estimating cue values alone, when 
factored out separately added significantly to the 
accuracy of the decisions made. Insofar as the results 
of this study were concerned, merely requiring a 
preprocessing estimation step either by use of a 
structured decision step or through the use of computer-
integrated data markedly enhanced the accuracy of the 
final diagnostic judgment made. Similarly, Sniezek & 
Reeves (1986) investigated the impact of what was termed 
a feature cue; i.e. summarized data reflecting prior 
performance on a cue probability learning task. Results 
indicated the presence of the feature cue greatly 
improved prediction achievement and accuracy. Similar 
results were obtained in a study by Utley et al (1987) 
where accuracy of teachers' analysis of student 
performance was compared with and without summarized data 
available. Although the diagnostic judgments made in 
these studies are not as complex as those required in 
psychological diagnosis, nor was the mechanical aiding as 
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complex as that normally used in software-assisted 
decision making, the results of both are strongly 
suggestive of the effect that preprocessed data can have 
on decisions rendered. 
There is no currently available literature that has 
experimentally manipulated the diagnostic decision 
process of the school psychologist by varying the 
influence of interpretive software decision aids. Green, 
however, (1982) designed a study where a group of 
experienced psychiatrists, psychologists, and social 
workers evaluated three different interpretive software 
reports. Two of the reports were based on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and one was 
based on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI). 
One hundred different cases were judged on the basis of 
the manner in which the interpretive software decision 
affected their understanding of their clients. The 
interpretive software reports were rated on a modified 
Likert scale across categories related to adequacy of 
information, confirmation of knowledge, addition of 
relevant information, exclusion of important case 
information and degree of inclusion of trivial and 
misleading information. The raters found significant 
differences among the three interpretive software systems 
in terms of information accuracy; especially in the 
extent to which the report "extended" or "enriched" their 
knowledge. A trend in the data seemed to indicate the 
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programs that did not appear to exclude as much data were 
rated as adding more to the knowledge of the user than 
the programs with less information. 
In early interpretive programs the intent was to 
simulate, as nearly as possible, the analyzing and 
synthesizing functions of the human test interpreter and 
to produce a report similar in style and content to a 
report written by a clinician (Fowler, 1969; Klett & 
Pumroy, 1971). Interpretive software developed by 
Kleinmuntz (1963) for use with the MMPI (Hathaway & 
McKinley, 1942) was the first computer-based decision aid 
to be developed for the interpretation of a psychological 
test. Software for the MMPI continues to be the most 
widely used and available type of interpretive software 
product (Butcher, Keller, & Bacon, 1985). Since that 
time, a number of other commercial and noncommercial 
interpretive systems have become available, for example 
The Minnesota Report (Butcher, 1979), The Caldwell Report 
(Caldwell, 1971), and the WPS Test Report (Lachar, 1974). 
Other than the MMPI, interpretive software decision 
aids are probably most widely available for the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (Wechsler, 1974) 
and the other Wechsler series intelligence tests. They 
are most widely used to gain an estimate of the 
individual's cognitive abilities and to assist in the 
prediction of an individual's level of achievement in 
school. There are a wide variety of interpretive schema 
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available for the Wechsler series (e.g. Bannatyne , 1974; 
Kaufman, 1979; Sattler, 1982). Interpretation of the 
Weschler series is rather complex given these 
interpretive schemas, factors related to chronological 
age, considerations of standard errors of measurement and 
the calculations and interpretations involved in 
determining statistically significant differences between 
subtest scaled scores and or IQ scores (Fisher & Jenkins, 
1986). Further, the clinician may, and often does, 
choose to adopt one primary method of interpreting 
Wechsler profiles and excludes others because of the 
effects of training, habit, time constraints, and the 
complexities of some of the methods. Because of these 
factors Wechsler interpretive programs have been 
considered to be of some assistance to the clinician by 
reducing the opportunity for clerical and mathematical 
errors. They also make available to the clinician models 
for interpretation that can generate hypotheses for 
further consideration in the decision making process. 
In a review of the WISC-R 90 program (Trifletti, 
Trifletti, & Trifletti, 1983) Quinlan & Quinlan (1984) 
described it as producing "voluminous" material that was 
not considered to be pertinent and that might imply 
serious psychopathology when psychopathology clearly was 
not indicated. Watkins (1986) reviewed the same program 
and was concerned that it did not make available evidence 
supportive of the validity of interpretations. He 
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concluded the program had serious technical and 
professional limitations and failed to adequately control 
for the possibility of misunderstanding or misuse of 
output. Fisher & Jenkins (1986) compared three d i fferent 
commonly available interpretive software programs, the 
WISC-R Computer Report (Nicholson, 1982), the WISC- R 
Monitor (Mercadal, 1982) and The WISC-R Analysis 
(Lichtenwald, 1982) by entering actual case data from one 
case into each of the three programs. In their 
nonstatistical comparative analysis they found many 
differences across the programs; both in generated 
content and interpretive statements, as well as in the 
respective approaches to the integration of the data . 
Some of these approaches appeared to integrate data in a 
manner inconsistent with commonly accepted practice. 
Although Fisher & Jenkins made no attempt to address the 
validity of the program output or to determine its affect 
on the decision making process of the user, they termed 
the programs "useful" in both clinical and training 
areas. Wiese and Grossman (1986), in a review of The 
Explorer (Vance & Paparella, 1983), and Hoffman (1985) in 
a review and comparison of The Explorer and nine other 
software programs for the Wechsler series found similar 
inconsistencies. They variously described some of the 
programs as having some "useless" features, "erratic" 
operation, "lacking in professional sophistication and 
polish," and "impressive to the non-professional 
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but ... mundane to the practicing school psychologist." At 
the same time, the value to the profession varied from 
"weak" to "useful" to "pleasing" with ''great [but 
unspecified] professional value." 
Replogle (1982) developed a WISC-R interpretive 
program which was validated in a study that compared case 
analyses completed by practicing school psychologists 
with analyses generated by the interpretive software. 
The judges, licensed psychological examiners and 
psychologists with varying degrees of advanced education 
and experience, rated the analyses on the basis of the 
content and accuracy of the analyses, as well as on its 
strengths and weaknesses. A MANOVA analysis of the 
results indicated the interpretive software reports were 
rated significantly higher than the reports generated by 
human examiners. 
The validity of the interpretive software systems in 
general has been attacked vigorously (Fowler, 1980; 
Matarazzo, 1983) because, for the most part, the validity 
of the resulting interpretations have yet to be 
established. For example, in a review of attempts to 
validate MMPI interpretive programs, Moreland (1985) was 
unable to reach any definitive conclusions about the 
their overall validity. Eyde, Kowal, & Fishburne (1986), 
in a comparison of nine different systems, were only able 
to conclude that interpretive systems are "good to use as 
long as good clinical judgment is used." Nonetheless 
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these decision aids have generally, yet variably, been 
determined to be well-received by clinicians. (Space, 
1981) . 
It is difficult to determine the number of 
interpretive systems and similar aids that have 
implications for assessing human behavior. In 1984 Krug 
listed 190 of these products. As new products are 
continually being developed, this estimate should be 
considered to be very conservative. 
McDermott Multidimensional Assessment of Children. 
McDermott & Watkins (1985) refined classification 
analysis into what they termed "systems actuarial 
multidimensional classification analysis." It was 
presented as an alternative to traditional clinical and 
actuarial classification currently being utilized by 
school psychologists. Their intent was to develop a 
comprehensive and standardized system for the 
classification of childrens' functioning that was 
objective, reliable, valid, logically consistent, and 
useful to both practitioners and researchers. It was 
made available as a microcomputer-based software program, 
the McDermott Multidimensional Assessment of Children (M-
MAC) (McDermott & Watkins, 1985). Prior versions of the 
software were developed as early as 1977 with a program 
entitled MAC (McDermott, 1977; 1980) developed for use on 
a mainframe computer. 
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The systems actuarial approach used in M-MAC 
systematically, and in decision tree style, considers the 
status of the characteristics of a child or the 
relationship between two such characteristics and then 
moves on in a predetermined sequence of such 
considerations. At each step questions are asked 
regarding the statistical probability of relationships 
between variables such as general intelligence, school 
achievement, measures of adaptive behavior, and 
indicators of social-emotional adjustment. Decision 
rules are actuarial in nature and reportedly modelled 
after national standards for differential diagnosis, such 
as American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 
criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation, learning 
disability according to federal definition, and academic 
over and underachievement according to regression 
formulae. 
McDermott and Watkins noted several advantages over 
more conventional diagnostic systems. First, clinical 
diagnoses are based primarily on experiential probability 
where the probability of relationships between child 
characteristics and consequent decisions is typically 
drawn from a clinician's past experiences and from their 
education and training. In contrast, M-MAC diagnoses are 
based on the statistical probability of such 
relationships and are derived through a normative 
perspective of child development. Second, the systems 
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actuarial approach does not focus exclusively on one or 
another dimension of classification as do many clinical 
methods. Rather, the software is programmed to assume 
that all children share common dimensions of personal 
qualities and differ only in the intensity of the 
relationships among these qualities. Hence, every child 
can be conceivably characterized on the dimensions of 
intellectual functioning, academic achievement, adaptive 
behavior, and social-emotional adjustment. Finally, the 
M-MAC systems actuarial approach provides classifications 
that are assumed to be maximally consistent across 
psychologists and congruent with ideal standards and 
accepted definitions. 
M-MAC requires that the school psychologist provide 
certain data as system input; i.e. demographic 
information, standard scores for general intelligence and 
academic achievement, and standard scores or clinical 
judgments for adaptive behavior and social-emotional 
adjustment. The software program, in addition to the 
algorithms described, stores reliability and validity 
coefficients, means, standard deviations and other 
statistical information for 30 commonly and uncommonly 
used tests and rating surveys used by school 
psychologists. Therefore the clinician has a wide range 
of data input sources to choose among. Provision is 
also made so consideration can be made for special 
factors that may influence the validity of the actual 
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test scores utilized. These include, but are not limited 
to the existence of handicapping conditions, special 
linguistic considerations such as being raised in a 
bilingual household, cultural factors, and environmental 
factors. 
Output is variable depending upon the choices of the 
clinician. The narrative output reflects the 
individual's performance on the assessment measures plus 
cautionary statements, when necessary, to indicate that 
the conclusions generated may lack validity. Diagnoses 
based on the ICD-9 and the DSM-III classification system 
are optionally available as are certain diagnoses not 
included in those systems. See Appendices A and D for 
details and examples of narrative output. 
There is probably more research data on the M-MAC 
system than any other interpretive system in common use 
other than the MMPI systems. Nevertheless, few studies 
have addressed the validity or utility of M-MAC. In fact 
most of the studies noted were completed on M-MAC's 
earlier version of MAC. McDermott & Hale, 1982 and 
McDermott (1982a) used both highly experienced and newly 
trained child psychologists to evaluate and classify 73 
children referred to outpatient clinics. The same test 
scores were used as input to MAC. The result was that 
cojoint agreement for each diagnostic category between 
psychologists and MAC was 86% in excess of chance. 
Reliability of diagnostic classification was assessed as 
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well. MAC's 100% reliability was compared to that of 
expert psychologists who agreed with each other at 76.5% 
above chance and newly trained psychologists agreeing at 
4 . 6% above chance. According to the program manual, the 
current version of M-MAC was successfully field tested in 
five states by so-called "child specialists" (McDermott 
et al, 1984). In a subjective review by Thomas (1986), 
M-MAC was considered "cumbersome" to use in the context 
of day to day school psychological practice. Bracken 
(1986), in another review, suggested its value to the 
profession was minimal and could " ... stimulate a feeling 
of technological pseudosophistication." Other 
"research" per se is unavailable. Although McDermott and 
his colleagues appear to be satisfied with the validity, 
reliability, and utility of M-MAC (McDermott, 1986) there 
is not as yet sufficient evidence the system does any 
more than provide what could eventually turn out to be an 
accepted diagnostic standard in child classification. 
Rubin (1986) has concluded that computer-generated 
decision aids should play a role as a general screen and 
guide to be interpreted by the clinician but not used as 
an absolute standard. This is similar to the use of x-
rays or laboratory test results in traditional medicine. 
By utilizing the computer as assisting the psychologist 
to interpret the data (Loesch, 1986; Walker & Myrick, 
1985) fears of school psychologists being replaced by 
"intelligent" computers (Altemose & Williamson, 1981) can 
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be reduced. Instead, the computer can be considered to 
be a valuable assistant. In 1971 Klett & Pumroy 
described the state of the art regarding psychologists ' 
use of computers. They were unable to determine what 
indeed the value of the computer would be to the 
practicing psychologist. Their question has remained 
largely unanswered. Therefore, the major question now is 
not one of how valid are the diagnostic classifications 
generated by M-MAC, but how does the use of computer-
based interpretive software such as M-MAC affect the 
diagnostic decisions made by school psychologists? 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
The major questions of this study are designed for 
analysis as an experimental posttest-only control group 
design and the supplemental questions as a pre-
experimental design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) that has 
been modified with random assignment of subjects . After 
a discussion of the subjects, variables, and procedures 
of the study; a description of the data analysis is 
followed by threats to its validity. 
Subjects 
Two hundred one active members of the National 
Association of School Psychologists (NASP) were selected 
at random from its current membership roster as subjects 
for this study. They were selected because Association 
membership is generally representative of the school 
psychologists practicing in the United states. Upon 
receipt of the subjects' names from the membership 
roster, the names were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental groups by use of a random number table. 
Sixty-seven subjects were allotted to each of the three 
groups for an initial total sample of 201 school 
psychologist subjects. Out of the 201 questionnaires 
mailed to the subjects, 102 were actually returned for a 
total return rate of 50.7%. There were no significant 
differences in rate of return across the treatment groups 
~ (2, N = 201) = .3582, R = .84. Of the total 
questionnaires returned three were discarded as 
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unusable; one because the subject had analyzed the data 
with microcomputer software which would confound any 
treatment effects and the others because the individuals 
were not practicing school psychologists. Further, some 
of the responses from thirteen other returned 
questionnaires were partially unusable because of missing 
data or because some of the responses (from nine of the 
subjects) made to the stimulus data were illogical and 
inconsistent with reality. See Appendix G for the 
responses omitted. These types of unusable responses 
were spread relatively evenly across the three subject 
groups. 
Experience of subjects as school psychologists was 
not significantly different across the three experimental 
groups, 1( 2 (6, N. = 96) = 3.48, R = .18. Most of the 
respondees (92%) had more than one year of experience as 
a practicing school psychologist with the remaining 8% 
having had less than one year of experience. Nearly 37% 
of the respondees had over 10 years of experience. 
Each of the subjects was asked to state the degree 
of experience they had had in using any type of computer 
within their day to day practice of school psychology . 
Again, when all possible uses of computers were 
considered together, the three subject groups did not 
differ significantly in their experience 
1(2(6, 96) = .6948, R =.71. As a total group, on a scale 
of one indicating no use of computers in current 
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Table 1 
Extent of Computer Use by Practicing School Psychologists 
Type of Use Median Interquartile Range 
Word Processing 3.00 4 
Report Writing 1.00 3 
Test Scoring 1.00 2 
Test Interpretation 1.00 1 
Case Management 1.00 1 
Counseling/Therapy 1.00 0 
Other Uses 1.00 0 
Composite of All Uses 2.00 1 
Note. Values range from 1 (No Use of Computers) to 5 
(Frequent Use of Computers). 
professional practice, to a maximum possible of five 
indicating frequent use of computers in professional 
practice; the overall median computer use was two with an 
interquartile range of one. See Table 1. Each of seven 
individual types of computer use were analyzed separately 
to determine if computer use was different across groups . 
I n every instance there was no significant difference in 
computer use across subject groups. Word processing and 
report writing uses were most frequently reported with 
test scoring and test interpretation uses next most 
frequently reported. 
Independent Variables 
Availability of a microcomputer-based interpretive 
software decision aid was the major independent variable 
utilized in this study and was varied across the three 
subject groups. Each of the two experimental subject 
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groups were provided microcomputer-generated narratives 
in addition to case data typically available to a school 
psychologist in the course of a psychological evaluation. 
A third control group received the case data, but not the 
narrative. See Table 15 located in Chapter IV. 
Group 1: Computer Decision Aids Not Available 
The subjects in Group 1 (the control traditional 
decision makers) were asked to make two diagnostic 
decisions and a series of prognostic decisions on the 
basis of case data provided by the experimenter. No 
constraints were placed on the manner in which they made 
their decisions. In this way the decision making process 
generally parallelled the decision processes involved in 
actual field-based school psychological decision making . 
See Appendix B for the case data provided the Group 1 
subjects and Appendix F for the decisions that the 
subjects were instructed to make. 
Groups 2 & 3: Computer Decision Aids Available 
The remaining two groups of subjects were asked to 
make the same diagnostic and prognostic decisions on the 
basis of the same case data and test scores which were 
available for the nonsoftware-aided decision makers. 
Each of the subjects was also provided with a copy of one 
form of output from an interpretive software program, the 
McDermott Multidimensional Assessment of Children (M-MAC) 
(McDermott & Watkins, 1985). The output of many software 
decision aids, including M-MAC, can be varied according 
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to different parameters defined by the user. Two out of 
the many possible output alternatives generated by M-MAC 
were utilized; a different alternative to each of the two 
experimental groups. 
Group 2 subjects each received an M-MAC analysis 
that integrated case data separately across each of two 
domains of assessment (intellectual abilities and 
academic achievement). Subjects were provided printed 
microcomputer output which included statistically 
analyzed case data and an associated descriptive 
narrative. Group 3 school psychologist subjects received 
the same narrative output as described above except that 
it also included a multidimensional diagnostic 
classification. For a detailed explanation of how these 
alternatives were generated see Appendix A. Refer to 
Appendix D for the actual microcomputer narrative output. 
Both computer generated output narratives included 
obtained WISC-R IQs, standard confidence limits, factor 
deviation quotients and their confidence limits, and a 
paragraph describing interpretations of differences among 
the deviation quotients. Also included was the overall 
qualitative level of intellectual functioning. Wide 
Range Achievement Test-Revised scores were analyzed by M-
MAC in a similar manner. Included in the analysis were 
the obtained subscale scores and their respective upper 
and lower 95% confidence intervals. Also included were 
the deviation of the subscale scores from the student's 
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average performance level and the results of a regression 
analysis highlighting any discrepancy between observed 
and expected academic achievement. Finally a statement 
indicating the relative frequency of discrepancies 
between expected and obtained achievement in these 
situations in the general population was provided. A 
summary table concluded the output for the achievement 
domain and presented narrative that recorded the child's 
achievement status relative to both age peers and to 
intellectual functioning across reading, spelling and 
arithmetic. The Group 3 narrative also included a 
diagnostic classification printed at the end of the 
output. 
Examples of Groups 2 and 3 stimulus materials are 
located in Appendices Band D. These stimulus materials 
are adapted from actual M-MAC program output, but the 
original output was reformatted to conserve space in 
mailing. A few minor changes were also made in the 
actual narrative in order to enhance control of external 
variables. 
In order to better approximate the kinds of 
information available to the typical psychologist making 
a decision, a narrative (Appendix B) including reason for 
referral, behavioral observations, test scores, and 
pertinent background information was included for both 
the experimental groups and the control group. All 
subjects received the same narrative and a listing of 
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relevant standardized test scores. Because of the 
intrinsic subjective nature of projective personality 
instrument interpretation, objective descriptors 
(response themes, picture descriptions, etc . ) were used 
in lieu of any scoring or statements ''describing" the 
child's personality. Test scores used in the M-MAC 
analysis were limited to those available indicated within 
the case data sheet provided all subjects. 
Dependent Var~able 
In addition to the case materials and decision aids 
described, each subject was provided with an 
instruction/response sheet (Appendix F). The subjects 
were asked to consider the data in the packet and place 
an "x" beside the diagnostic and prognostic decisions 
which best described the case material. Listed for 
consideration, in a random order determined through the 
use of a random number table, were the four nonmedical 
handicapping conditions currently defined by state and 
federal regulations as educational handicapping. A fifth 
possible diagnosis, "no educationally handicapping 
condition" was also available for choice and was included 
in the list. The subjects were also asked to make 
diagnoses in the form of probability estimates for each 
of the handicapping conditions. Here the subject 
psychologists entered probability estimates for each 
category that ranged from 0% probability to 100% 
probability that the child described in the case data 
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could be considered to be handicapped under each of the 
five labels previously noted. Also they were asked to 
respond, with similar probability estimates, to f ive 
prognostic statements relating to the child described in 
the case material. 
The case data presented for considerati on by all 
subjects was data obtained by a professional school 
psychologist from an actual test protocol which had all 
identifying information removed and replaced by 
fictitious demographic data in a manner that maintained 
the confidentiality of the original case material. The 
narrative paragraph was adapted from, but did not 
duplicate, actual case material to further disguise the 
true identity of the individual actually evaluated . The 
content of the case material met the definitional 
requirements of learning disability and at the same time 
generally precluded a diagnosis of seriously emotionally 
d i sturbed or multihandicapped. Descriptors used in the 
background information and teacher comments were 
constructed in a manner that typified that received in 
the course of a school psychologist's day to day 
practice. See Appendix B for the actual case material . 
Procedures 
Each subject was provided a cover letter (Appendix 
E), an instruction/response sheet (Appendix F), and the 
appropriate case material based upon the randomly 
assigned experimental condition (Appendices B & D). They 
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were instructed to make their diagnostic decisions and 
probability estimations as previously described. After 
the decisions had been made; they were instructed to open 
a sealed piece of paper and enter requested information . 
More specifically they were asked to enter demographic 
information and answer questions related to their use of 
computers in professional practice, whether or not they 
used an interpretive software or other decision aid in 
the decision process, and what sources of data they found 
to be influential as they made their decision. They were 
then instructed to place the completed forms in an 
enclosed preaddressed and stamped envelope. All subjects 
were requested to separately return a stamped post card 
with their name and address to assist the experimenter in 
determining which subjects needed to be sent follow-up 
notices. The first follow-up reminder notices wer.e sent 
three weeks after the date of the original materials 
mailing . Another follow-up request took place two weeks 
later. Data analysis began after approximately 16 weeks 
had elapsed from the original mailing. No further 
responses were received after that time. 
Data Analysis 
The two major hypotheses of this study were designed 
to examine how the use of computer-based interpretive 
software by school psychologists affects clinical 
decisions made by school psychologists. Hypothesis One 
focused upon the degree of agreement among decision 
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makers and hypothesized that agreement among school 
psychologists who use computer-based decision aids is 
higher than diagnostic agreement among school 
psychologists who do not use computer-based decision 
aids. Each source of data, i.e. diagnostic decision, 
categorical decision, or prognostic decision was 
analyzed by statistical analyses appropriate for their 
scaler properties as well as for meeting standards for an 
indicator of diagnostic agreement. The probability 
estimates of handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions as 
well as the five prognostic probability estimates for 
each subject group were analyzed using Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance (~), which describes the 
association between the characteristics of k related 
samples. In this case, the relationship or association 
of the probability estimates for each of the handicapping 
conditions or each of the prognostic statements were 
analyzed. According to McDermott's (in press) discussion 
of the differences between statistical measures of 
agreement per se versus statistical measures which 
indicate relationships only among ratings, Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance is the appropriate 
statistical measure of agreement for this kind of ordinal 
scale data. The categorical decision, however, was 
analyzed by weighted kappa <'l(m) (Fleiss, 1971; Light, 
1971), a measure of internal consistency that allows 
level of agreement for nominal scale data to be measured 
I .. 
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among more than two observers. Weighted kappa provides 
an outcome measure that estimates the joint agreement of 
m observers that exceeds chance. Significance tests and 
multiple comparisons appropriate for use with Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance (Minium, 1978) and for 
weighted kappa (McDermott, in press) were completed as 
required by the comparisons stated in Hypothesis One. 
Hypothesis Two proposed that the decisions of school 
psychologists who have available different variations of 
the same computer decision aid will not be significantly 
different from each other. More specifically, the 
ultimate diagnostic/prognostic decisions made will not be 
significantly different even though the computer output 
of the decision aid is qualitatively different. The 
probability estimates of each 
handicapping/nonhandicapping condition as well as 
(separately) the probability estimates of the five 
prognostic questions were analyzed in a stepwise manner 
utilizing Friedman's analysis of variance for dependent 
variables (Gibbons, 1985). First, for each subject 
group, the probability estimates for each 
handicapping/nonhandicapping condition were compared 
according to a Friedman analysis to ascertain variation 
of the estimates across the handicapping/nonhandicapping 
conditions. Post hoc pairwise multiple comparisons of 
the handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions were 
completed to more precisely delineate the patterns of 
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subject responses; i.e. agreement across diagnostic 
categories. Finally, the patterns of agreement within 
each subject group were compared across the three subject 
groups to answer the overall hypothesis. For the 
categorical decisions chi-square analyses were utilized 
to test the relationships between the diagnostic 
decisions and subject groups for the comparisons called 
for in the hypothesis. 
Supplemental Questions One and Two were designed to 
more closely examine the subjective effects of different 
data sources upon the decisions made by the school 
psychologist subjects. 
Supplemental Question One was approached as a 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance for ordinal data. 
Appropriate post hoc multiple comparisons were calculated 
to ascertain differences in influence among the 
respective data sources available to each individual 
subject group. 
Supplemental Question Two was analyzed by 
correlating degree of professional school psychological 
experience with ratings on influence of data sources. A 
second correlation was similarly performed between degree 
of experience in using computers and subject ratings on 
the influence of data sources. 
Threats to Validity 
So the data and conclusions generated by this study 
can be put into proper perspective, threats to the 
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validity of the results of this study will be described 
based primarily upon Cook & Campbell's (1979) 
perspective. 
The primary differences between the major hypotheses 
and the supplemental questions involve the availability 
of appropriate comparisons across subject groups. The 
designs for the supplemental questions do not necessarily 
include simultaneous comparisons with control groups . 
Therefore conclusions were generated based on the data 
from (often) one subject group which necessarily 
precluded controlling for many sources of variation . 
Consequently, conclusions generated for the supplemental 
questions should be considered to be preliminary analyses 
of relationships rather than the more definitive 
experimental conclusions of the major questions. Unless 
otherwise noted, sources of validity and invalidity to be 
described below will be considered to apply to both the 
major hypotheses and supplemental questions. However, 
the degree to which they apply will necessarily vary 
according to the question asked. 
Internal/Statistical Conclusion Validity 
According to Cook and Campbell, the analysis should 
be sufficiently sensitive so that reasonable conclusions 
about the covariation of the variables and the casual 
relationships, if any, between the variables can be made . 
An analysis of the various components of 
internal/statistical conclusion validity finds the design 
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of the study was generally moderately sensitive to these 
issues, although it is clear that adjustments in 
methodology would be indicated in similar studies in the 
future. 
The dilemma of statistical power, i.e. Type II 
error, is a serious consideration when sample sizes are 
small and alpha values are set relatively low as they 
were in this study. Although the possibility of Type I 
error was minimized, there remains uncertainty as to 
whether actual treatment effects were overlooked because 
of the sample size of approximately 30 subjects per 
condition and because of the variation in statistical 
power of the nonparametric tests used. Although the Type 
II error rate per analysis perhaps was increased by these 
factors, Type I error was mitigated by maintaining an 
alpha level of .05 for the major comparisons. It was 
also minimized by making adjustments in alpha levels for 
the many multiple comparisons called for in the analyses. 
Similarly, the alpha level was made more stringent for 
the correlations in Supplemental Question Two in order to 
reduce the number of random, yet significant correlation 
coefficients that could be expected to be generated in 
the course of the 120 correlation calculations therein. 
Other threats to validity may have been a function 
of basing the results of the analysis on one particular 
case or collection of stimulus data points instead of 
many . The use of one case to reflect the population of 
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cases is statistically weak and is limited in its ability 
to show desired phenomena. This is because there are not 
enough occasions for accessing the systematic presence or 
absence of effect of the major variables. The use of 
several cases would have decreased the possibility that 
any one aspect of the case material may have 
inadvertently contributed to uncontrolled variability in 
the outcome measures. This effect was probably most 
pronounced in the obtained weighted Kappa values for the 
categorical data of Hypothesis One. 
Random assignment of the subjects to treatment or 
nontreatment control groups, however, effectively 
minimized most of the other potential sources of internal 
invalidity. Further those threats which randomization 
does not account for, according to Cook & Campbell, 
{imitation of treatments; resentful demoralization of 
r espondents receiving less desirable treatments, etc . ) 
are not pertinent to this study and have a low 
probability of affecting its internal validity. 
External/Construct Validity 
External validity is considered to be the degree to 
which the results of the study can be generalized to 
situations of interest in the environment or, in the case 
of construct validity, the ability to generalize to other 
related abstract constructs. Here the pertinent 
comparisons relate to the extent to which the data 
reflect the day to day decision making practice of 
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professional school psychologists. Threats to the 
validity of the study would tend to decrease the 
applicability of the data generated herein and decrease 
the intrinsic value of the study. 
Considered as a whole construct validity was fairly 
adequate considering this study is one of the first 
studies to explore many of the constructs associated with 
computer-aided decision making with professional school 
psychologists. Although the data cannot be directly 
applied to all of the many constructs related to 
computer-aided decision making among school 
psychologists, it does provide a firm base that future 
research can build upon. 
The term "agreement" as specified in Hypothesis One 
is one such example. According to McDermott (in press) 
many different statistical measures have been used to 
define the construct of agreement. The analyses utilized 
in Hypothesis One meet specific standards for the concept 
of agreement as described in the Data Analysis subsection 
in this chapter and can be considered to enhance the 
construct validity of this study. One drawback, however, 
is that the literature has not completely embraced 
McDermott's stringent criteria for agreement. As such 
many older studies and some recent studies do not define 
the term "agreement as stringently as does McDermott. 
Therefore the construct of agreement as defined herein 
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may be different than that predicated in some of the 
related literature. 
To decrease reliance on one source of data for an 
outcome measure (mono-operation bias) and to provide 
stimulus materials that approximate the various types and 
formats of decisions made in day to day practice of 
school psychologists, three related, yet different types 
of decisions were made by the subjects on the basis of 
the case data. Mono-method bias; i.e. the use of one 
method only to gather data, was not mitigated, but is 
nonetheless is considered to have little effect on the 
validity of the study. This is because it was the intent 
of this study to maximize external validity per se by 
closely approximating decision making in the real 
environment of a school psychologist. Therefore, 
different presentation methods were not considered to be 
as important as the need to maximize the parallel between 
the method and what actually occurs in the field. 
Other threats to construct validity such as 
evaluation apprehension, experimenter expectancies, and 
hypothesis guessing within experimental conditions can be 
considered to have had little negative impact on the 
interpretation of this study. This is primarily a design 
issue as the stimulus materials were fashioned and 
presented in a manner that approximated decisions made 
day to day more than they did that of an artificially 
contrived experiment. Further the experimenter himself 
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had no direct contact with the subjects except via the 
letter requesting participation in the study. 
Threats to external validity per se were generally 
minimal. As the subjects were randomly selected members 
of the largest professional organization in the United 
States representing the interests of school psychologists 
there is a reasonable probability the individuals chosen 
reflect the population of school psychologists at large. 
Also because they were randomly selected the 
probabilities are lessened that there was an interaction 
of selection of subject and treatment effect. Any 
definitive statement would be premature because 
approximately 50% of the subjects chosen did not choose 
to participate in the study. An analysis of their years 
of professional experience indicated the vast majority of 
the subjects had more than one year of experience which 
increases the probability that the results reflect the 
decision making patterns of experienced professionals 
rather than those individuals with little experience in 
the field. 
With respect to the case data itself and the manner 
in which the subjects were asked to make their decisions, 
the probability of external invalidity was significantly 
moderated. This was accomplished by designing the 
stimulus materials in a manner that closely approximated 
the type and volume of data sources available to a school 
psychologist as he/she generates diagnostic decisions . 
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Overall, the threats to validity of this study are 
considered to be moderate and in general similar to the 
validity of the majority of similar studies cited in the 
literature. Decisions and conclusions related to this 
study should therefore be tempered with the 
considerations just described. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
The results of the major hypotheses will be 
presented followed by the results of the supplemental 
questions. 
The two major hypotheses were investigated in terms 
of subject responses to each of three different data 
points considered to reflect the kinds of diagnostic and 
prognostic decisions typically made by practicing school 
psychologists. The subjects generated probability 
estimates for each of four handicapping and one 
nonhandicapping conditions as well as for five prognostic 
questions; all of which were based on case material 
provided each subject. Also each subject was asked to 
choose the primary handicapping condition (if any) 
represented by the case material. 
The decisions recorded by the subjects had different 
scaler properties. Therefore different statistical tests 
and data transformations were required across the 
respective analyses. The data was further adjusted by 
omitting consideration of one of the handicapping 
conditions, mental retardation. This action was taken 
because it was not chosen by any of the subjects in any 
of the experimental groups as either a categorical 
diagnostic decision nor was it considered to be anything 
but 0% probable where probability estimates were called 
for. This category was dropped from the analysis 
because , according to McDermott (in press), categories 
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never chosen cannot be considered to be viable categories 
for an analysis of agreement. At most any effect of the 
diagnostic category of mental retardation was evenly 
distributed across the three subject groups and should 
therefore have had no differential effect on any outcome 
measures of agreement. 
Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One related directly to the concept of 
diagnostic agreement. It posited that diagnostic 
agreement among school psychologists who used computer-
based decision aides would be significantly higher than 
diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who did 
not use the decision aids. Results for each of the three 
types of decisions are presented separately as well as 
summarized in Table 15. 
Probability Estimates for Each 
Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Condition 
The probability estimates made for each of three 
handicapping and one nonhandicapping condition were 
considered to reflect ordinal rankings ranging from less 
probably handicapped (or nonhandicapped, as appropriate) 
to more probably handicapped/nonhandicapped. An analysis 
of the probability estimates made by the subject decision 
makers indicated that agreement (concordance) according 
to the criteria of McDermott (in press) within each 
decision making group ranged from Kendall's ~ (3, N = 
29) = . 496 for the decision makers who did not have 
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Table 2 
Summary Table of Kendall Coefficients of Concordance for 
Probability Estimates of Handicapping/Nonhandicapping 
Conditions for Each Subject Group 
Chi-Square Significance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
. 496 43.17 4 *p < . 001 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
. 351 29.47 4 *p < • 001 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, Classification 
.503 45.30 4 *p < .001 
Note: The number of subject responses in each group were 
similar; i.e. 29 subjects in Group 1, 28 subjects in 
Group 2, and 30 subjects in Group 3. 
access to computer-based decision aids tow (3, N = 28) 
= .351 for the decision makers who had access to the M-
MAC narrative and statistics to N (3, N = 30) = .503 for 
the decision makers who also had access to the M-MAC 
classification. In each instance the coefficients of 
concordance were significantly different from zero. See 
Table 2. As the magnitude of Kendall's N ranges from 
zero to a maximum of one these results were indicative of 
at least moderate agreement among rankings for each of 
the three subject groups. Fisher's~ to i score 
Table 3 
Mean Rankings .of the Probability Estimates of 
Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Conditions for Each 
Subject Group 
LD NEH SED LANG 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
3.52 1.48 2.21 2.79 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
3.46 2.04 2.02 2.48 
7 3 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, Classification 
3.73 1.85 2.12 2.30 
Note. LD indicates "Learning Disabled." 
NEH indicates "Not Educationally Handicapped." 
SED indicates "Seriously Emotionally Disturbed." 
LANG indicates "Language Disabled." 
The ranks range from values of 1 through 5 with higher 
values indicating a higher probability of the indicated 
handicapping/nonhandicapping condition. 
transformation (Minium, 1978) was used to test 
hypotheses of differences in magnitude of these 
coefficients of concordance from subject group to subject 
group at a 95% confidence level. In no instance were any 
of the coefficients of concordance obtained within any of 
the subject groups significantly different from their 
counterparts in any other subject group. Further the 
mean rankings of the conditions as reported in Table 3 
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also tend to indicate general consistence in mean 
rankings of handicapping/nonhandicapping condition. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that diagnostic agreement for 
the probability estimates of handicapping/nonhandicapping 
conditions among school psychologists who use computer-
based decisions aids is significantly higher than 
diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who do 
not use the aids is not supported by the data. 
Categorical Decisions 
When asked to choose a primary handicapping 
condition, the subjects made their choice on the basis of 
discrete categories, i.e. learning disabled, language 
disabled, seriously emotionally disturbed, mentally 
retarded, and not educationally handicapped. 
A weighted Kappa analysis for each of the three 
experimental groups found weighted Kappa to be not 
significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Although 
not significant, the weighted Kappa coefficients were 
very close to a value of zero and suggestive of neither 
real agreement nor real disagreement exceeding chance 
among raters within each group. See Table 4 for specific 
details. Obtained weighted Kappa coefficients from each 
of the two computer-assisted subject groups were compared 
for significant differences and no significant 
differences in agreement were obtained. Neither were 
there significant differences between the weighted Kappa 
coefficients for Groups 1 and 3 and for Group 1 as 
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Table 4 
Diagnostic Agreement Exceeding Chance for Categorical 
Diagnoses by Type of Decision Aid Available Accordi ng to 
Weighted Kappa 
Variance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Avai l abl e 
-.032 .036 p > .05 
Group 2: Computer Narrative and Statistics Availabl e 
- . 033 .179 p > . 05 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, Classification 
-.036 .054 p > . 05 
compared to Group 2. When the actual percentage of 
psychologists choosing each category were compared across 
the three groups (Table 5) the psychologist subjects d i d 
not consistently choose one category as the primary 
handicapping condition. With the exception of apparently 
somewhat moderate agreement for the category of learning 
disability there was little agreement within groups for 
the other handicaps. Therefore the hypothesis that 
diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who use 
computer-based decision aids is significantly higher than 
diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who do 
not use computer-based decision aids cannot be supported 
for the categorical decisions herein. 
Table 5 
Percentage of Psychologists Choosing Each Categorical 
Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Condition According to 
Subject Group 
LD NEH SEO LANG 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
64.7% 17.6% 8.8% 2 . 9% 
Group 2: Computer Narrative and Statistics Available 
71.0% 9.7% 3.2% 12.9% 
76 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
84.4% 3.1% 3.1% 6 .3 % 
Note . LD indicates "Learning Disabled." 
NEH indicates "Not Educationally Handicapped . " 
SEO indicates "Seriously Emotionally Disturbed." 
LANG indicates "Language Disabled." 
The percentages do not add up to 100% across the rows 
because of missing data from a few cases. 
Prognostic Probability Estimates 
The responses to the five prognostic questions 
(See Appendix F) were analyzed in the same manner as the 
prognostic probability estimates for the handicapping 
conditions i.e., for agreement according to Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance (H). Here again (except for 
prognostic question four) the numerical probability 
estimates were considered to be ordinal rankings in terms 
of lesser to greater probabilities of future difficulties 
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Table 6 
Summary Table of Kendall Coefficients of Concordance for 
the Probability Estimates for Prognostic Questions 1-5 
for Each Subject Group 
Chi-Square Significance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
.571 75.37 4 *12 < • 001 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
.507 54.79 4 *12 < • 001 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
.587 65.74 4 *12 < • 001 
Note: The number of subject responses in each group were 
similar; i.e. 33 subjects in Group 1, 27 subjects in 
Group 2, and 28 subjects in Group 3. 
in the educational and vocational environment for the 
student described in the case data. For prognostic 
question four, rankings of a greater magnitude were 
indicative of fewer difficulties in the future. In each 
instance, agreement within the three decision making 
conditions were analyzed separately. An analysis of the 
probability estimates made by the subject decision makers 
indicated that agreement (concordance) within each 
decision making group ranged from N (4, N = 33) = .571 
for the noncornputer-aided psychologists 
Table 7 
Mean Rankings~ of the Prognostic Probability Estimates 
for Prognostic Questions 1-5 for Each Subject Group 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
4.29 3.26 3.67 1.77 2.02 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
4.13 2.74 4.04 1.98 2.11 
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Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
4.39 3.13 3.75 1.71 2 . 02 
Note. See decision/response sheet in Appendix F for the 
actual prognostic questions. 
aThe ranks range from values of 1 through 5 with higher 
values indicating a higher probability of future 
adjustment difficulties of the individual described by 
the case data except for question four where the higher 
values indicate a lesser probability of future adjustment 
difficulties. 
to N (4, H = 27) = .507 for those psychologists who had 
access to the M-MAC narrative and statistics to N (4, H = 
28) = .587 for the decision makers who also had access to 
the M-MAC classification. In each instance each Kendall 
coefficient was significant and indicated that the 
agreement within each group was significantly different 
than zero. Please refer to Table 6. Fisher's~ to z 
score transformation was again used to test hypotheses of 
differences in magnitude of the coefficients of 
concordance from subject group to subject group at a 95% 
confidence level. In no instance were any of the 
coefficients of concordance obtained within any of the 
subject groups significantly different from their 
counterparts in any other subject group. Further, the 
mean rankings of the conditions as reported in Table 7 
also tend to indicate general consistence in mean 
rankings of prognostic probability estimates. Therefore 
the hypothesis that agreement of the probability 
estimates for the prognostic questions among the 
psychologists who used computer-based decisions aids is 
significantly higher than agreement among school 
psychologists who did not use the aids is not supported 
by the data. 
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis Two compared decisions made with and 
without the use of computer-based decision aids in terms 
of the differences and similarities in the actual 
decisions made. It was hypothesized that decisions made 
in connection with two variations of the same 
interpretive software program would be more similar to 
each other than to those decisions made without the use 
of decision aids. The same data points, probability 
estimates for handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions, 
categorical handicapping conditions, and prognostic 
probability estimates for the five questions were used to 
answer the hypothesis. The three types of decision data 
points will be discussed separately. 
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Table 8 
Summary Table of Friedman Analyses of variance for the 
Probability Estimates of Handicapping/Nonhandicapping 
Conditions for Each Subject Group 
80 
Chi-Square Significance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
Group 2: 
Group 3: 
29 39.00 3 *p < . 001 
Computer Narrative & Statistics 
28 23.15 3 *p < . 001 
Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
30 38.35 3 *p < . 001 
Probability Estimates for Each 
Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Condition 
A series of Friedman analyses of variance for 
dependent variables; one for each of the three subject 
groups, were completed. Each was significant and 
indicated the rankings of each of the four probability 
estimates by the subjects within each group were 
significantly different from each other. see Table 8, 
Pairwise multiple comparisons were completed for all 
possible combinations of handicapping/nonhandicapping 
conditions (Table 9) in order to compare differences in 
rankings among the diagnostic decisions within each 
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Table 9 
Pairwise Comparisons of Differences in Probability 
Estimates of Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Decisions for 
Each Subject Group 
LD NEH SED LANG 
Group 1 *p < .05 *p < .05 NS 
LO Group 2 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 
Group 3 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 
Group 1 NS *12 < .05 
NEH Group 2 NS NS 
Group 3 NS NS 
Group 1 NS 
SED Group 2 NS 
Group 3 NS 
Note. LD indicates "Learning Disabled." 
NEH indicates "Not Educationally Handicapped." 
SED indicates "Seriously Emotionally Disturbed." 
LANG indicates "Language Disabled." 
Group 1 indicates "Computer Decision Aids not 
Available." 
Group 2 indicates "Computer Narrative & 
Statistics." 
Group 3 indicates "Computer Narrative , statistics, 
& Classification . " 
subject group. As indicated by Table 9 the two computer-
assisted groups agreed with each other in terms of the 
significance or nonsignificance for 100% of the available 
paired comparisons of the rankings of the diagnostic 
categories. The pairwise comparisons of the rankings of 
the subjects who did not have computer decision aids 
available agreed to a lesser extent with the two 
computer-aided conditions. Only 66% of the comparisons 
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were in agreement with those comparisons of the computer-
aided conditions. 
Although both groups of computer-assisted 
psychologists ranked the probability of learning 
disability to be significantly higher than that of a 
language disability (R < .05), the rankings of these two 
handicaps did not differ significantly in the 
noncomputer-aided condition. Similarly, the computer-
assisted subjects showed no significant difference in the 
rankings of the probability estimates of language 
disability and of not educationally handicapped, but the 
noncomputer-aided psychologists ranked the probability of 
language disabled to be significantly higher than that of 
not educationally handicapped (R < .05). Descriptive 
comparisons of the raw data (Table 10) suggest little 
variation across the three subject groups in the 
psychologists' choices of probability estimates for the 
handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions. This is 
especially true for the conditions of learning disability 
and not educationally handicapped. However, the pattern 
of responses for the category of seriously emotionally 
disturbed presented somewhat of a trend for differences 
between the estimates made by those subjects who had 
access to the computer aid and those who did not. The 
computer-assisted decision makers tended to rate 
seriously emotionally disturbed as less probable than the 
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Table 10 
Percentage of Psychologists Choosing Each Probability 
Estimate for Handicapping/Nonhandicapping Condition 
According to Subject Group 
Probability 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Estimate of: 
Group 1 2.9% 8.8% 14.7% 52.9% 5 . 9% 
LD Group 2 3.3% 10.0% 30.0% 43.3% 6 . 7% 
Group 3 3.1% 3.1% 25.0% 50.0% 12.5% 
Group 1 58.8% 23.5% 5.9% 0.0% 0 . 0% 
NEH Group 2 43.3% 36.7% 10.0% 3.3% 0 . 0% 
Group 3 46.9% 34.4% 9.4% 3.1% 6.3% 
Group 1 17.6% 32.4% 38.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
SED Group 2 43.3% 33.3% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 
Group 3 21.9% 50.0% 18.8% 3.1% 0.0% 
Group 1 8.8% 26.5% 23.5% 26.5% 2 . 9% 
LANG Group 2 26.7% 36.7% 13.3% 16.7% 0.0% 
Group 3 18.8% 46.9% 18.8% 9.4% 0.0% 
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% across the 
rows because of missing data from a few cases. 
nonassisted decision makers who tended to waver more at 
the undecided 50% probability level. Similarly the 
percentage response by group in Table 10 further suggests 
a trend on the part of those with the decision aids 
towards ratings of lesser probabilities of a language 
handicap than the noncomputer-assisted psychologists. 
Together, these data indicate that Hypothesis Two is 
supported by the data for the probability estimates of 
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handicapping conditions because the diagnostic decisions 
made by school psychologists on the basis of different 
applications of the same computer decision aid were 
indeed more similar to each other than to those 
diagnostic decisions made by school psychologist subjects 
not utilizing computer decision aids. 
Categorical Decisions 
Chi-square analyses were utilized to test the 
relationships between the diagnostic decisions and 
subject groups. Two separate analyses were performed. 
One compared the diagnostic decisions made without the 
assistance of computer decision aids with those made with 
interpretive software assistance. The second analysis 
compared the decisions made on the basis of the two 
variations of M-MAC output; i.e. the categorical 
decisions of the Group 2 subjects compared with those of 
the Group 3 subjects. See Table 11. In order to 
minimize the number of cells in the analysis with an 
expected frequency of less than five it was necessary to 
collapse the ratings. The three subject groups were 
collapsed into two groups. The noncomputer-aided 
decision group remained intact, but the two groups of 
subjects who had a microcomputer decision aid available 
were combined together. Also, the actual diagnostic 
decisions were combined together in two separate ways. 
Because of the preponderance of "learning disability" 
choices among the raters across all three subject groups 
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Table 11 
Subject Group Comparisons for Categorical Decisions 
Comparison Chi-Square df Significance 
Group 1 vs 
Groups 2 & 3 Combined 
Learning Disabled/ 
Nonlearning Disabled 
Handicapped/ 
Nonhandicapped 
Group 2 vs 
Group 3 
.98 1 p > . 05 
2.11 1 p > . 05 
Learning Disabled/ 
Nonlearning Disabled 
1.06 1 R > . 05 
Handicapped/ 
Nonhandicapped 
.30* 1 R > . 05 
Note: All Chi square values are after Yates correction. 
Group 1 indicates "Computer Decision Aids not 
Available." 
Group 2 indicates "Computer Narrative & 
Statistics . " 
Group 3 indicates "Computer Narrative, Statistics, 
& Classification." 
*Analysis with at least one cell with an expected 
frequency of less than five which could make the data 
somewhat misleading. 
and because of the considerable uncertainty regarding 
the term "learning disability" in the literature (Dawson, 
1985), the diagnostic categories were collapsed into two 
categories, "learning disabled" and "not learning 
disabled." A second recombination was derived based upon 
the concept of educational handicap with the original 
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data being transformed into the categories of "not 
handicapped" and "handicapped." Nevertheless, the 
analysis that compared the two computer-aided conditions 
together on the dimension of "handicapped" and 
"nonhandicapped" had at least one cell with an expected 
frequency of less than five which could make the results 
of that particular analysis somewhat misleading. This 
analysis is noted with an asterisk in Table 11. All 
other expected frequencies were five or greater. 
In each instance chi-square was not significant and 
the categorical decisions therein cannot be considered to 
be different for the different groups. As expected the 
decisions made by the two groups who had access to the 
microcomputer decisions aids were not significantly 
different from each other. Therefore the hypothesis that 
categorical diagnostic decisions made on the basis of 
different applications of the same computer-assisted 
decision aid will be more similar to each other than to 
those decisions not utilizing decision aids cannot be 
totally supported. At best the data indicate there are 
no significant differences between the categorical 
decisions made among the subject groups across the 
dimensions of learning disabled and nonlearning disabled 
as well as the dimensions of handicapped and 
nonhandicapped. 
Table 12 
summary Table of Friedman Analyses of Variance for the 
Probability Estimates for Prognostic Questions 1-5 for 
Each Subject Group 
Decisions Chi-square Significance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
33 61.32 4 *p < • 001 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
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27 45.85 4 *p < . 001 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
28 57.52 4 *p < . 001 
Prognostic Probability Estimates 
The five prognostic statements were analyzed for 
agreement on the basis of a second series of Friedman 
analyses of variance (Table 12); again one for each of 
the three subject groups. As with the probability 
estimates of handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions just 
described, all three analyses were significant and 
indicated that the rankings of the five prognostic 
probability estimates by the subjects within each group 
were significantly different from each other. Pairwise 
multiple comparisons were completed for all possible 
combinations of prognostic probability estimates one 
through five in order to compare differences in rankings 
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Table 13 
Pairwise Comparisons of Differences in Probability 
Estimates for Prognostic Questions 1-5 for Each Subject 
Group 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Group 1 NS NS *p < .05 *p < . 05 
Ql Group 2 NS NS *p < .05 *p < .05 
Group 3 NS NS *12 < .05 *12 < .05 
Group 1 NS *12 < .05 NS Q2 Group 2 NS NS NS 
Group 3 NS NS NS 
Group 1 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 
Q3 Group 2 *12 < .05 *12 < .05 
Group 3 *12 < .05 NS 
Group 1 NS 
Q4 Group 2 NS 
Group 3 NS 
among the prognostic decisions within each subject 
group. The two computer-assisted groups agreed with each 
other in terms of significant or nonsignificant 
differences between pairs of prognostic questions for 90% 
of the available paired comparisons. See Table 13 . The 
pairwise comparisons of the rankings of the subjects who 
did not have computer decision aids available agreed to a 
somewhat lesser extent with the two computer-assisted 
conditions. Ninety percent of the comparisons in Group 1 
were in agreement with the analogous Group 2 comparisons 
and 80% of the comparisons of Group 1 were consistent 
89 
with those in Group 3. The exceptions to agreement among 
the pairwise comparisons were not consistent from group 
to group. For the comparison of Question 3 {"The child 
will be referred again as an educationally handicapped 
child.") and Question 5 {"The child will have difficulty 
competing in the vocational marketplace as an adult") the 
difference in rankings was not statistically significant 
for the subjects who had the computer classification 
available, but there was a significant difference in the 
mean rankings for the subjects of the two other groups. 
The comparison of Question 2 {"The child will demonstrate 
future social adjustment problems.") with Question 4 
{"The child will successfully graduate from high 
school."), however, found the rankings of the questions 
to be significantly different for Group 2 psychologists 
only. Descriptive comparisons of the raw data (Table 14) 
across the three subject groups indicate little, to, in 
one instance, at most moderate, (Question 2 only) 
variation in percentage of psychologists' choices of 
probability estimates for the prognostic questions. The 
data therefore cannot support Hypothesis Two and instead 
suggests that the there is no real difference across the 
three subject groups in terms of the prognostic 
probability estimates made by the respective subjects. 
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Table 14 
Percentage of Psychologists Choosing: Each Probability 
Estimate for Prognostic Questions 1-5 by Subject Group 
Probability 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Estimate of: 
Group 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 32.4% 64.7% Qla Group 2 0.0% 3.3% 6.7% 50.0% 40.0% 
Group 3 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 40.6% 56.3% 
Group 1 0.0% 2.9% 26.5% 35.3% 35.3% 
Q2 Group 2 0.0% 16.7% 30.0% 43.3% 6 . 7% 
Group 3 0.0% 31.3% 40.6% 18.8% 3 . 1% 
Group 1 0 . 0% 0.0% 8 . 8% 50.0% 38 . 2% 
Q3 Group 2 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 56.7% 30 . 0% 
Group 3 0.0% 6.3% 12.5% 46.9% 31.3% 
Group 1 8.8% 26.5% 44.1% 14.7% 2.9% 
Q4 Group 2 0.0% 36.7% 46.7% 13.3% 0.0% 
Group 3 0.0% 46.9% 37.5% 9.4% 0 . 0% 
Group 1 2.9% 23.5% 44.1% 17.6% 8.8% 
Q5 Group 2 0.0% 26.7% 50.0% 16.7% 3.3% 
Group 3 3.1% 25.0% 46.9% 25.0% 0.0% 
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% across the 
rows because of missing data from a few cases. 
aPlease refer to Appendix F for the actual question 
content. 
Table 15 
Summary Table of Outcomes of Analyses for Questions One 
and Two According to Type of Decision 
Probability 
Estimates of 
Handicapping/ 
Nonhandicapping 
Conditions 
Categorical 
Handicapping/ 
Nonhandicapping 
Conditions 
Hypothesis One 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
Prognostic Not Supported 
Probability 
Estimates of Questions 
1-5 
Hypothesis Two 
Supported 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
91 
92 
Supplemental Questions One and Two were designed to 
more closely examine the subjective effects of different 
data sources upon the decisions made by the school 
psychologist subjects. 
Supplemental Question One 
The case materials provided each of the subjects 
formed the basis of Supplemental Question One. It asked, 
for each of the three experimental conditions, which data 
sources were considered by the subjects to be the most 
influential in the their decision-making. 
Each of the three subject groups had different data 
sources available during the decision making process and 
by necessity they were analyzed separately by subject 
group. At least four of the data sources were available 
to all of the subjects; six of them to those subjects in 
experimental Group 2 and a total of seven to experimental 
Group 3. Table 16 lists the data sources that were 
available to each subject group. Table 17 reflects the 
percentage reported influence of the case data sources as 
well as their median influence and associated 
interquartile ranges. The ratings were made on an 
ascending ordinal scale where a rating of one indicated 
"no influence" and five was indicative of "much 
influence." 
A series of Friedman analyses of variance for 
ordinal rankings were used to analyze the differences in 
subject rankings for each particular subject group . 
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Table 16 
Data Sources Available to Subject Groups 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Reason for 
Referral 
* * * 
Background 
Information 
* * * 
Behavioral 
Observations 
* * * 
Test 
Data 
* * * 
M-MAC 
Statistics 
* * 
M-MAC 
Narrative 
* * 
M-MAC 
Classification 
* 
Note: A"*" indicates that the data source was available 
to the subjects within the group. 
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Table 17 
Percent Influence of Data Sources by Experimental Group 
Reason 
for 
Referral 
Backgrd 
Informa-
tion 
Behavior 
Observa-
tions 
Test 
Data 
M-MAC 
Stats 
M-MAC 
Nar-
rative 
M-MAC 
Classi-
ifica-
tion 
Group 1 
N% No Influence 26.5% 
N% Moderate Influence 38.2% 
N% Much Influence 31.4% 
Median 3.0 
Interquartile Range 2.0 
N% No Influence 2 . 9% 
N% Moderate Influence 29.4% 
N% Much Influence 64.7% 
Median 4.0 
Interquartile Range 1.5 
N% No Influence 0.0% 
N% Moderate Influence 17.6% 
N% Much Influence 79.5% 
Median 4.0 
Interquartile Range 1.0 
N% No Influence 0.0% 
N% Moderate Influence 5.9% 
N% Much Influence 91.2% 
Median 4.0 
Interquartile Range 1.0 
N% No Influence 
N% Moderate Influence 
N% Much Influence 
Median 
Interquartile Range 
N% No Influence 
N% Moderate Influence 
N% Much Influence 
Median 
Interquartile Range 
N% No Influence 
N% Moderate Influence 
N% Much Influence 
Median 
Interquartile Range 
Group 2 Group 3 
26.6% 12.5% 
33.3% 43.8% 
33.4% 43 . 8% 
3 . 0 3.0 
2.0 1.0 
13.3% 9 . 4% 
26.7% 37.5% 
56.7% 53.2% 
4.0 4.0 
1.0 1.0 
3.3% 0.0% 
20.0% 31. 3% 
73.4% 68.7% 
4.0 4.0 
1.5 1.0 
3.3% 6.5% 
13.3% 12.9% 
80.0% 78.2% 
4.0 4 . 0 
1.0 1.0 
56.7% 54.8% 
23.3% 32.3% 
16.3% 12.9% 
2.0 2.0 
1.0 1.0 
56.7% 64.5% 
26.7% 25.8% 
14.4% 9.7% 
2.0 2.0 
1.0 1.0 
80.2% 
19.4% 
0.0% 
2.0 
1.0 
Note: The percentages do not sum to 100% because of 
missing data. 
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Where there was a significant main effect of differences 
in data influences, post hoc pairwise multiple 
comparisons were applied to determine the relative 
magnitudes of these differences. Each subject group will 
be discussed separately. 
Group 1: Computer Decision Aids Not Available 
The main effect of data influences was significant 
here X2 (3, N = 33) = 17.88, p < .001 and indicated that 
the rankings of the data influences by the subjects were 
significantly different from each other. See Table 18. 
Pairwise comparisons between types of data influences 
indicated that Behavioral Observations and Test Data were 
considered by the psychologists to be significantly more 
influential than Reason for Referral. As differences 
between all other available comparisons were 
nonsignificant, Behavioral Observations and Test Data are 
apparently the most influential data sources for the 
psychologists who did not have computer decision aids 
available to them. 
Group 2: Computer Narrative and Summary Statistics 
Available 
Here too the main effect of data sources was 
significant in a Friedman analysis of variance 
-X 2 (5, N = 28) = 42.30 p < .001. See Table 18. An 
analysis of the fifteen available pairwise comparisons 
found Behavioral Observations and Test Data to be 
significantly more influential (p < .05) than the 
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Table 18 
summary Table of Friedman Analyses of Variance of Degree 
of Influence of Data Source by Type of Data Source for 
Each of the Three Decision Making Subject Groupings 
N Chi-Square df Significance 
Group 1: Computer-Based Decision Aids Not Available 
33 17.88 3 *p < .001 
Group 2: Computer Narrative & Statistics 
28 42.30 5 *p < . 001 
Group 3 : Computer Narrative, Statistics, & Classification 
30 100.35 6 *P. < .001 
computer-related data sources, i.e. the M-MAC Narrative 
and the M-MAC Statistics. As all other comparisons were 
nonsignificant, these two data sources appear to have 
been considered by the school psychologist decision 
makers to be subjectively more influential than any of 
the other data sources. 
Group 3: Computer Narrative, Statistics, and 
Classification Available 
As with the other subject groups, the main effect of 
data sources was significant in a Friedman analysis of 
variance ')( 2 (6, N = 30) = 100.35 P. < .001. See Table 
18. Differences between the individual data sources 
generally followed the pattern indicated for Group 2 
' ! 
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subjects with no significant differences between pairs of 
data sources that were not computer-generated; i.e. for 
example Reason for Referral, Background Information, etc . 
The same was true for the three computer-generated data 
sources. However, except for Reason for Referral, all of 
the other noncomputer-generated data sources were 
considered to be significantly higher in influence than 
the M-MAC Classification (R < .05). Like the two other 
groups, the data reflects that the subjects of Group 3 
indicated that with the exception of Reason for Referral, 
the noncomputer generated data sources were considered to 
be more influential than the computer-generated data 
sources. 
The data presented suggests that apparently the 
subjects seemed to be rather more consistently influenced 
by the test data or the test data in association with 
other traditional data sources than they were of the data 
generated by M-MAC. The M-MAC diagnostic classification 
itself seemed to have been considered as the least 
influential data source by those individuals to whom it 
was presented as an option. 
Supplemental Question Two 
Supplemental Question Two attempted to ascertain 
what the relationship was between school psychologists' 
professional experience level and degree of experience 
with using computers in clinical practice to the sources 
of information which they found to be most influential in 
[ 
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Table 19 
Coefficients of Correlation Between Years of Professional 
Experience as a School Psychologist and Influence of Case 
Data Sources 
Reason 
Referral 
Background 
Information 
Behavioral 
Observations 
Test Data 
M-MAC 
Statistics 
M-MAC 
Narrative 
Group 1 
.08 
.12 
.03 
-.31 
M-MAC 
Classification 
Group 2 
.10 
.10 
.05 
.14 
- .13 
-. 08 
Note. p > . 05 in each instance. 
Group 3 
-. 15 
-. 18 
-. 12 
-. 19 
-. 24 
-.10 
. 05 
the diagnostic decision-making process . The data was 
analyzed by correlating degree of experience as a school 
psychologist with each of the individual ratings on 
influence of data sources. A second correlation was 
executed between degree the diagnostic decision-making 
process. The data was analyzed by correlating degree of 
experience as a school psychologist with each of the 
---- - - - -- --- - -------------------
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individual ratings on influence of data sources. A 
second correlation was executed between degree of 
experience in using computers with ratings on the 
influence of individual data sources. Each correlation 
was completed for each experimental group individually. 
Years of experience was treated as ordinal data with four 
ascending categories of experience ranging from less than 
one year to over ten years of experience. Influences of 
data sources and extent to which the subjects had used 
computers within their clinical practice were also 
considered to be ordinal data on an ascending scale from 
one to five. A rating of one indicated either no 
influence or experience and five indicated much influence 
or frequent use, respectively. See Appendix F, the 
decision/response sheet. Kendall's tau was utilized as 
the measure of association for each analysis . 
Professional Experience as Related to Influence of Data 
Sources 
The data indicate that there was no significant 
relationship between years of professional experience as 
a school psychologist and influence of any of the data 
sources; traditional or computer-generated; for subjects 
individually by treatment groups. See Table 19. A 
preliminary analysis had also indicated that there were 
no significant relationships when all of the subjects 
were considered together as one group. 
100 
Table 20 
Significant-Coefficients of Correlation Between Extent of 
Use of Computers in the Course of Professional School 
Psychological Practice and Influence of Case Data Sources 
Test Scoring 
Reason for 
Referral 
Test 
Interpretation 
M-MAC 
Statistics 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 
.so* 
. 55* 
Note: P < .01 in each instance. All of the other 100 
plus correlation coefficients generated cannot be 
considered to be significantly different from zero . 
Degree of Experience Using Computers as Related to 
Influence of Data Sources 
Considering that the number of correlations computed 
exceeded 100 for this analysis, it is estimated that 
chance alone would generate a few significant 
correlations irrespective of any real relationships . 
Therefore an alpha level of .01 was utilized to test the 
significance of correlation coefficients obtained and to 
minimize Type I error. With the exception of two 
significant correlations (Table 20); one each for the 
noncomputer-aided subjects and the subjects who had the 
. 
-
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M-MAC classification available, no statistically 
significant relationships were observed between use of 
computers in professional practice and influence of data 
sources. For the noncomputer-aided group reason for 
referral was positively related to use of a computer for 
test scoring. For the subjects who had access to the M-
MAC classification, the use of a computer for test 
interpretation was positively related to the influence of 
M-MAC statistics. Otherwise there appeared to be no 
significant relationships between degree of professional 
experience in the use of computers and the influence of 
the data sources available to the subjects for any of the 
three subject groups. 
-
-
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS 
Scope and Focus 
1 02 
This chapter study will first review the rational e 
for the study in the context of the current literature 
fo l lowed by the results, conclusions and limitations of 
the study. Implications for future research and 
professional practice follow. 
Rationale 
Ethical, professional and legal standards mandate 
the deci s i ons made by school psychologists in the course 
of day t o day practice be valid and free from intentional 
bias . The decisions to be made, however, are decisions 
that have h i storically been considered to be biased and 
of limi ted validity and reliability. The final 
interpretation of a given set of data seems to depend 
primari ly upon the manner in which the psychologist has 
i diosyncratically integrated the available data. 
The decision making literature reflects the general 
opinion that decisions can be debiased through the use of 
decision a i ds . Attempts to debias the decision process 
and thereby make the decisions more consistent across 
practitioners have been variably successful at best . The 
meager school psychological and educational literature 
that is available lends support to the premise the 
avai l ability and use of preprocessed and summarized data 
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from a mechanical/nonhuman source improves the quality 
and consistency of decisions ultimately made. Computer-
based interpretative software is one such data source and 
therefore has the potential to significantly decrease 
bias and systematic error in the decision making process. 
Ethical practice, however, currently prohibits the 
independent use of interpretative software without 
practitioner review. Instead, computer-based 
interpretive software must be considered to be a decision 
aid or simply another data source to be utilized by the 
psychologist in the course of day to day decision making. 
The purpose of this study, then, was examine the utility 
of computer-based decision aids in their role as decision 
aids for the professional school psychologist. 
Hypotheses 
It was specifically hypothesized that diagnostic 
agreement among school psychologists who had computer-
based decision aids available would be significantly 
higher than diagnostic agreement of school psychologists 
who did not have the decision aids available. A second 
hypothesis proposed that actual decisions made by school 
psychologists who used different variations of the same 
computer-based decision aid would be more similar to each 
other than to those diagnostic decisions made by 
psychologists who did not have access to computer-based 
decision aids. Supplemental Question One investigated 
which data sources were considered by school 
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psychologists to be most influential in their decision 
making. Relationships between professional experience 
level and degree of experience in using computers with 
sources of information considered to be most influential 
were analyzed in Supplemental Question Two. 
Methodology 
In order to test these hypotheses, randomly selected 
members of the National Association of School 
Psychologists were randomly assigned to either one of two 
experimental groups or to a control group. Each subject 
was provided information designed to qualitatively and 
quantitatively reflect case data materials that a school 
psychologist typically has prior to making a diagnostic 
or prognostic decision on a referred child. The two 
experimental groups of subjects also received one of two 
variations of the output from a currently available 
computer-based test interpretation software package. 
Each psychologist was asked to make diagnostic and 
prognostic decisions that were designed to reflect the 
types of decisions made by school psychologists. They 
were also asked which data sources were most influential 
in the decisions made, as well as relevant demographic 
information. 
Results and Conclusions 
Hypothesis One proposed that diagnostic agreement 
among school psychologists who used computer-based 
decision aides would be significantly higher than 
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diagnostic agreement among school psychologists who did 
not use the decision aids. The hypothesis was not 
supported with the data for any of the three types of 
decisions made by the subjects. 
According to psychological decision theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1980), data that is readily 
available in memory and/or that is representative or 
brings to mind similar situations have been found to 
directly influence the ultimate decisions made. In 
theory, the computer generated output should have become 
readily available in short term memory; i.e. a discrete 
cue for the decision maker indicating that learning 
disability was the diagnosis of choice. Diagnostic 
agreement should then have been higher than when no 
decision aid was available because each psychologist 
subject would have been exposed to and affected by the 
same major cues in the computer output. The cues 
available to the nonaided subjects, however, varied 
according to how the individual psychologist personally 
structured the decision problem and the cues which were 
idiosyncratically most salient. Agreement among the 
nonaided decision makers should have been lower as a 
consequence. This did not happen and is probably most 
explainable in terms of the data from Supplemental 
Question One where the subjects were asked to indicate 
which data sources were most influential. In each 
instance, and for each subject group, the computer-based 
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data influences were rated lower than any of the 
traditional data sources common to subjects in all three 
groups. Apparently the computer output did not have 
affective salience sufficient to outweigh the heuristics 
operationalized through a reading of the case data. It 
is also possible that the salience was not sufficient to 
overcome the influence of cumulative years of decision 
making based upon time worn frames of reference. This 
was apparently the case in Nisbett et al (1982), where 
decisions made with the standard, objective data sources 
were no different than those made on the basis of 
"obviously haphazardly sampled information." Further, 
there continues to exist a substantial degree of 
uncertainty regarding the validity of the content of the 
computer-generated reports and perhaps of computers in 
general. This is especially probable given that among 
practicing school psychologists; experience with 
computers other than for word processing is so minimal 
(Table 1 and Brantley et al, 1985). The uncertainty may 
also be a function of the considerable debate in the 
literature regarding unresolved ethical and practical 
problems relating to the use of computers in a profession 
that has traditionally considered decision making as an 
art rather than as a hard science. 
Hypothesis Two proposed there would be no 
significant differences in decisions made in connection 
with two variations of the same interpretive software 
107 
program. Also the ultimate decisions made with the use 
of a decision aid would be significantly different from 
those decisions made without the use of a decision aid . 
Here, the less stringent concept of similarity of 
decisions was tested. The data indicated that for at 
least one kind of judgement, probability estimates of 
handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions, there was a 
differential effect of availability of decision aid. 
Also, as hypothesized, there appeared to be a trend in 
the data to suggest that different variations of M-MAC 
did not have a differential effect on the decisions 
made. This is not surprising given the degree to which 
the subjects indicated that the computer-based data 
sources influenced them. 
Suggestions are that for these specific judgments, 
the computer output was sufficiently salient to frame the 
case data in a manner that was representative of the 
concept of learning disability and excluded serious 
consideration of the concept of language disability. The 
nonaided psychologists, however, seemed to have made 
their decisions on the basis of a schema wherein the 
differences between the concepts of learning disability 
and langauge disability were not clear cut enough to 
indicate one as substantially different than the other. 
The major differences in judgments appeared to be a 
function of the more probable categories of "learning 
disability" and ''not educationally handicapped" vis l vis 
108 
a less probable category, "language disability." 
Whereas the computer-assisted psychologists consistently 
reported learning disability to be more probable than 
language disability, the noncomputer-aided psychologists 
did not make the distinction. Similarly the computer-
aided psychologists found little difference in the 
probabilities of not educationally handicapped and 
langauge disabled whereas the other subjects did. A 
closer examination of the actual percentages of responses 
for each handicapping/nonhandicapping condition (Table 
10) seems to reinforce this trend. Here again the trends 
were not apparent for the rather straightforward 
conditions of learning disability and not educationally 
handicapped, but were more powerful for the conditions 
that were less likely or less clear cut; i.e. seriously 
emotionally disturbed and language disabled. The 
subjects in the noncomputer-aided conditions tended to 
make ratings which were more uncertain (50% probability) 
than the subjects in the computer-aided conditions who 
gave these handicapping conditions generally lower and 
more definitive probability estimates. 
Care should be taken not to overinterpret these 
results because of their descriptive nature. 
Nonetheless, subjectively, it is possible to describe the 
outcome in terms of the operation of heuristics. Most of 
the psychologist subjects found the case data to be 
representative of learning disability irrespective of 
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decision aid available. However, when the psychologists 
were forced to make a judgment regarding the probability 
of the less well-defined diagnoses of seriously 
emotionally disturbed or language disabled, the most 
readily available data, i.e. the computer narrative, was 
inconsistent with these diagnoses. The narrative 
probably functioned to increase the probability that 
these two categories would be considered to have low 
probabilities. However, where the computer decision aid 
was not available, the raters responded with a higher 
percentage of uncertain (50% probability) ratings. This 
would suggest that perhaps the availability of the 
computer output indicating learning disability may have 
been influential in the determination of probabilities 
for the more ambiguous and difficult to diagnose 
(Ysseldyke & Algozzine, 1981) conditions of seriously · 
emotionally disturbed and langauge disabled. The 
decisions of the nonaided psychologists, however, seemed 
to vary with changing decision choices and perhaps 
different cues within the case data as Rassen (1979) 
indicated in her analysis of school psychologist 
decisions. 
When comparisons were made across the three groups 
for the categorical decisions, there were no significant 
differences in diagnostic decisions. These findings, 
however, need to be tempered by the necessity of 
collapsing the categorical decisions into two sets of 
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dichotomous judgments, "learning disabled" versus 
"nonlearning disabled" and "handicapped versus 
nonhandicapped" so that adequate expected frequencies 
within the chi-square analyses were available. This may 
have obscured any real treatment effects; especially 
considering the effects noted so far have involved the 
less clear cut diagnoses of seriously emotionally 
disturbed and langauge disabled. 
The probability estimates for the prognostic 
questions did not conform to the hypothesis of more 
similarity between the computer-assisted groups than with 
the noncomputer-assisted groups of subjects. In fact, 
the data are more suggestive of a general consistency 
across the three groups in the prognostic decisions made. 
Unlike the probability estimates of the 
handicapping/nonhandicapping conditions where there was 
relative consistency across the computer-assisted subject 
groups, the pattern with the prognostic decisions was 
less clear cut. The pattern of responses to the 
questions across groups is perhaps best explained as a 
function of a combination of chance variation in 
decisions associated with the influence of heuristics 
common to the decision makers as a whole. The questions 
centered around relationships between disparate, yet 
related questions about expectations of future events. 
The probability of these events may or may not be 
directly related to current data and will be affected to 
I 
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an undetermined extent by unknown and unpredictable 
factors. The data sources most available or 
representative at the time the prognostic decisions were 
made were probably not evoked by the computer-generated 
output. Instead they probably were related to an 
undetermined data source that had a generally consistent 
effect among all of the psychologist subjects. This is 
reasonable as the computer output directly addresses 
diagnosis; not the more inferential prognosis. 
For the supplemental questions the school 
psychologist subjects, irrespective of treatment group, 
indicated test data and behavioral observations were the 
most influential data sources as they made their 
decisions. Further, the psychologists who had access to 
the computer aids found them to be significantly less 
influential than the noncomputer data sources. A trend 
in the data indicated the M-MAC diagnostic classification 
was considered to be the least influential of all of the 
data sources. Degree of professional experience as a 
psychologist was not significantly related to the 
influence of the data sources and should probably be 
ruled out as a contributing factor to this outcome . 
Degree of experience in using a computer within 
professional practice does not appear to be a 
significant factor in this outcome either, because with 
two exceptions, a significant relationship was not 
established between computer experience and the perceived 
112 
influence of data sources. The two exceptions were a 
significant correlation between experience in the use of 
computers for test scoring indicated by the nonaided 
subjects and a significant relationship between use of 
computers for test interpretation and M-MAC statistics by 
the subjects who had the M-MAC classification available. 
These might best be considered artifacts of the 
correlation matrix; especially the positive relationship 
between reason for referral and experience with test 
scoring. The positive relationship between experience 
with the use of computers for test interpretation and the 
influence of the M-MAC statistics for the psychologists 
who had the M-MAC classification is more logical in light 
of the data. This could be because individuals who use 
decision aids would be expected to find the M-MAC 
classification influential. However, correlations that 
would be reasonably related to this one such as those 
involving the M-MAC narrative and the M-MAC 
classification were not significant for any of the 
subject groups. As such the probability is increased 
that this significant correlation should also be 
considered to be a random occurrence with little apparent 
meaning within the context of the overall study. 
From these data it is apparent the computer-
generated output was considered by the school 
psychologists to be of relatively minor influence in the 
decisions they made generally irrespective of their 
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professional experience and their experience with 
computers. This factor may be related to the findings 
reported in Bar-Hillel (1982), Tversky & Kahneman, 
(1973), Nisbett et al (1980) and others in the 
literature of psychological decision making. These 
studies have generally concluded that empirical data has 
been perceived as generally less relevant or even 
coincidental to the question at hand as compared to more 
specific, personal, and therefore more affectively laden 
material. Apparently, the affectively laden material is 
perceived as more representative of similar instances and 
decisions were made on that basis instead of on the more 
objective data sources. In the school psychology and 
education literature this factor has been demonstrated 
too, as described in Dewitte (1976), Hersh, (1971), and 
the series of studies completed in the early 1980 1 s by 
Ysseldyke and his associates (Ysseldyke & Allongize, 
1981; Ysseldyke & Pianta, 1983, etc.) who generally 
concluded that decisions regarding educationally 
handicapping conditions are apparently often made on the 
basis of factors other than objective data. Thomas 
(1983) summarized the situation when he concluded that 
decision making in school psychology is often based on 
factors unrelated to formal assessment and instead is 
predicated on the context of the decision. 
In general, then, the computer-based test 
interpretive software program utilized in this study 
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should not be considered to be of significant utility in 
its role as a decision aid to the practicing school 
psychologist. Trends in the data, however, suggest that 
the utility of computer-based decision aids should not 
yet be ruled out and that more study is required before 
any definitive judgments can be made. The failure of 
the computer-generated output to overcome the effects of 
the salience of other sources of data is actually not too 
surprising given the status of computer-generated data in 
today's society. Although computers have been available 
for decision making in society for over four decades, it 
has not been until relatively recently they have become 
readily available for day to day use in the workplace 
and/or homes of more than a minority of the populace. In 
the practice of school psychology, they are still used by 
.a minority of practicing psychologists and therefore 
subject to misperceptions and an incomplete 
understanding of how they can function in the workplace. 
They still apparently present as a somewhat impersonal 
machine whose operations are antithetical to the highly 
interpersonal nature of school psychological practice. 
Therefore, any output generated is affectively paled by 
comparison to the "real" test scores and behavioral 
observations they have been trained to utilize in their 
decision making. 
The literature surrounding the role of computers in 
psychological practice and in particular diagnosis and 
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assessment has been particularly partisan and reflective 
of strong opinions on either side of the issue. A recent 
article by Kramer (1988) essentially concluded there are 
no firm conclusions regarding the use of computers in 
psychology and but instead "enormous" challenges need to 
be overcome prior to acceptance of their use in 
psychology's mainstream. With these considerations it is 
not surprising the affective salience of computer-
generated output as a decision aid was not of a 
sufficient magnitude to overcome the availability of 
other more traditional data sources. 
Limitations 
Each study has it limitations. The most salient of 
these limitations will be described in the following 
paragraphs. 
Perhaps the single most salient limitation in the 
design of this study was the inclusion of only one 
referred case for diagnostic and prognostic consideration 
among the subjects. The case did indeed reflect the kind 
of case that is typically received as a referral for 
school psychological decision making. However, by using 
one case, the entire analysis hinged on the interaction 
of the specific demand characteristics of the child 
described therein to the exclusion of other cases with 
other demand characteristics. Therefore, the results 
obtained should be tempered with the fact that there were 
probably not enough occasions for assessing the 
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systematic presence or absence of the major treatment 
effects. A design that utilized several cases randomly 
assigned to the subjects would have been preferable. 
Along similar lines, it would have been preferable to 
utilize more than one computer-based decision aid rather 
than to use two different applications of M-MAC. The 
major difference between the narrative output of the 
M-MAC classification (Group 3) and the M-MAC narrative 
and statistics (Group 2) was one paragraph at the end of 
the narrative. It is possible that some of the subjects 
overlooked or otherwise might not have considered the 
entire output provided. The use of more than one 
software package would also have enhanced the construct 
and external validity of the study. 
Given the trends of the descriptive data, it is 
entirely possible that treatment effects in the major 
hypotheses were obscured by factors related to inadequate 
sample size and perhaps the power of the statistical 
analyses utilized. It would be well-advised to 
substantially increase the subject sample in any future 
analysis of this type so the possibility of Type II error 
could be diminished more than it apparently was in this 
study. 
By the same token, limitations inherent in analyzing 
data of an ordinal nature; data which does not, by 
definition, have a single underlying distribution on 
which to base assumptions, may have contributed to an 
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undetermined loss of power. Although it was not 
necessary to meet as many of the underlying assumptions 
that would have been necessary if the data would have 
been of interval or ratio scale; the analyses utilized 
were necessarily less powerful than generally would have 
been attainable had the stricter assumptions and scaler 
qualities been met for the use of parametric statistical 
methods. 
Another limitation of the analysis was in the 
chi-square analyses of the categorical data of 
Hypothesis Two where it was necessary to significantly 
collapse the diagnostic categories into two separately 
analyzed dichotomous categories of "learning disabled;" 
"not learning disabled" and "handicapped;" "not 
handicapped." Although the derived categories themselves 
are relevant to the actual decisions made in school 
psychology, it is possible the transformed categories 
masked any differential treatment effect and again 
contributed to possible Type II error. 
Finally, a field study would have been preferable as 
the methodology only approximated the conditions and data 
sources available to the school psychologist decision 
maker . 
Implications for Future Research 
It is clear from these reeults that attempts at 
debiasing psychologist decisions with computer assistance 
is not a simple phenomenon. Future research should 
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address itself to both minimizing the limitations of the 
current research and building upon the data and methods 
herein in a manner that will more clearly delineate the 
strengths and weaknesses of computer-based decision aids. 
Future research should include a much larger sample 
of cases for the decision makers to analyze. This would 
effectively allow a much wider and much closer to reality 
sampling of variation across cases reviewed. It would 
also allow for more confidence to be placed in the 
outcome statistics. 
Attention should be given to the more global problem 
of relating the diagnostic category to the intervention . 
There is a need to more clearly investigate the efficacy 
of the decisions made instead of concentration upon 
measures of consistency alone. Although consistency is 
one aspect of validity; computer decisions aids and 
attendant research should concentrate upon development of 
systems whereby decisions can be empirically linked to 
effective intervention. Irrespective of how consistent 
decisions are; if the decisions have no treatment 
validity they are worthless in terms of instructional 
intervention. 
Computer-based decisions aids available for today's 
school psychologists are only rudimentary approximations 
of what the technology is in other disciplines and what 
it will be in the future. Current and emerging 
technologies should therefore be actively utilized in 
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research and development. The effect of the decision aid 
upon the ultimate decision made by the decision maker 
should be integrated into the software development 
process rather than investigated piece meal post hoc. In 
this way, the software can be tailored to function as a 
decision aid rather than as a maker of decisions whose 
decisions must be reviewed. 
In a similar vein, it is critical that subjective, 
available, affectively laden data points be integrated 
into the decision process in a manner wherein they can 
contribute to the treatment validity of the decision to 
be made rather than probably mitigate its effect. 
Computer-based expert systems do have this potential and 
should be developed for the use of psychologists as part 
of any ongoing research effort. By effectively 
integrating the subjective nuances inherent in any 
psychologist decision there are increased probabilities 
that computer decision aids might be more fully embraced 
by practicing school psychologists. 
Further some trends in the data indicated that 
there was perhaps a differential effect of the computer-
based decision aid. Any follow-up research on existing 
decision aids should more closely investigate those areas 
of the present research where the trends were most 
evident; i.e. where the decision choices were more 
ambiguous or of relatively low incidence as in the 
handicapping conditions of seriously emotionally 
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disturbed and language handicapped. This is because 
confining research to high incidence handicaps such as 
learning disability cannot truly provide an accurate 
predictor of the decision aid's utility due to the 
necessity to overcome the powerful effects of chance. 
Implications for Professional Practice 
Until computers and computer decision aids become 
more widely available and accepted by practicing school 
psychologists it will continue to be much easier for 
decisions to be made solely on the basis of clinical 
judgment. The profession tends to tolerate a moderate 
amount of inconsistency in judgment which decreases a 
need to utilize decision aids. Further, the software-
based decision aids currently on the market are not 
sufficiently utilitarian and powerful to overcome their 
negative press. It still remains just as easy to base a 
decision upon clinical judgment as it is to base it upon 
the output of a software package whose validity is 
unknown. Nonetheless, the development of computer-based 
decision aids has made it possible for some individuals 
in the profession to realize there is indeed an 
alternative to pure clinical judgment. Even if the 
current software packages do not meet the needs, the mere 
fact they do exist and have a demonstrated potential to 
make consistent and potentially valid decisions makes it 
more likely that the profession will gradually move more 
towards their use over the coming decades. Also the 
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currently available software packages can play an 
important role in training for psychological decision 
making. Their use with clinicians in training will 
increase the probability that a new generation of 
clinicians will be more familiar with their use and will 
not consider them to be the threat that many currently 
practicing clinicians do. The results of this study 
will not change how the profession feels about computer-
based decision aids, but it should provide an incentive 
to improve both the software packages themselves, the 
research surrounding them, and, most importantly, the 
quality of decisions that are made. 
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APPENDIX A 
M-MAC User Instructions 
123 
Many first generation interpretive software packages 
rigorously prescribe the data that the user enters into 
the system as well as the manner in which the data are 
combined by the system. M-MAC, however, allows the user 
rather wide latitude in determining what data is included 
for consideration by the software as well as the specific 
algorithms and decision options available. The system is 
designed in a manner which requires the user to make a 
series of choices which determine how M-MAC evaluates the 
data as well as what is presented in the program output. 
Because flexibility is built into the program the user is 
able to tailor the classification process according to 
specific situational, administrative, or client-specific 
needs. 
M-MAC diagnostic classification must be completed 
under one of three so-called operations modes; standard 
Mode, Special Mode, and Research Mode. The operation 
mode controls the quantity and complexity of options 
available to the user. For the purposes of this study 
all experimental conditions utilizing M-MAC operated 
under the Standard Mode. Here all basic decision rules 
are predetermined by the system's algorithms. 
Nonetheless the user has the ability to exercise several 
options which will be detailed shortly. Program output 
is conducted under standards detailed in the M-MAC manual 
and are assumed by the program authors to generate 
systematic identical classifications across all users 
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irrespective of the Standard Mode user options employed. 
McDermott & Watkins (1985) stated that use of Standard 
Mode output in classification decisions would assure that 
each deci sion meets an "international and interagency 
reference standard" instead of localized and 
inconsistent classifications commonly reported in the 
literature (See Chapter 2). Special Mode and Research 
Mode allow the user to alter many of the statistical 
parameters and decision rules according to special needs. 
As Special and Research Modes are not utilized in this 
study, the reader is directed to the M-MAC manual for 
detailed information. 
User defined options within the Standard Mode do not 
alter the statistical parameters used in the algorithms 
or other decision rules. Instead the user is allowed a 
series of options which define what information is 
actually utilized by the system, which classifications 
are generated, and the content of the actual output 
narrative. It is these parameters which were altered as 
levels two and three of the independent variable. They 
are most easily explained and understood within the 
context of a step-by-step explanation of the operation of 
M-MAC which follows. 
After a series of title and introductory screens, 
the user is instructed to provide demographic and 
identifying information on the student to be classified . 
The information requested is student name or identifier, 
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sex, evaluation date, date of birth, and education level 
(grade/type of program currently enrolled within). 
Variations in much of this information will influence 
system output primarily in the areas of the application 
of appropriate normative and other reference tables to 
specific child demographic variables; areas not under the 
d i rect control of the user in Standard Mode. 
The user is then asked to make the first major 
decision which will have a significant impact on the 
eventual narrative output of the program. "Enter 
exceptionality level?" Here the system asks the user to 
report certain idiographic personal and situational 
factors relating to the cultural, environmental, 
linguistic, and medical/physical background of the child . 
Further the user is asked to estimate the extent of the 
child's general adaptation to these circumstances. For 
example screen number 2 asks: "Please indicate any 
uncorrected physical handicaps that you know or suspect 
the child to have." If the user enters yes for any of 
the listed handicaps, then the system will automatically 
branch to another series of questions in an attempt to 
determine the extent to which the handicaps are 
influencing the child's daily functioning or may have 
influenced the child's test performance. 
Other options available are related to the user's 
determination of which data sources are to be included i n 
the resulting analysis. Within the Standard Mode the 
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user may analyze data on the basis of one chosen 
dimension (i.e. intellectual, achievement, adaptive 
behavior, or social-emotional adjustment) or on the basis 
of a multidimensional classification which includes and 
integrates findings from all four dimensions. 
Permutations of two to three dimensions are precluded . 
Choice of a single dimension analyses data from one of 
the scales only. If the user was interested only in the 
intellectual domain, then data from a selected 
intelligence test would be analyzed only. On the other 
hand, if a multidimensional classification was chosen, 
the system would analyze results from each of the scales 
separately. Then, at the end of the printed narrative, it 
would integrate the results and print a multidimensional 
diagnostic classification which classifies each child 
according to the dimensions of intellectual functioning, 
academic achievement, adaptive behavior, and social-
emotional adjustment. Optionally the system generates 
DSM-I I I and ICD-9 diagnostic descriptors. 
Within each dimension, the user may select from one 
of several supported tests or other assessment methods, 
The intellectual functioning dimension supports a total 
of six individually administered intelligence tests 
including the entire Wechsler series. The academic 
achievement dimension includes also six achievement 
measures ranging from the Wide Range Achievement Test-
Revised to the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement. 
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The adaptive behavior dimension supports a total of five 
scales including the Vineland Social Maturity Scale-
Revised and the social-emotional adjustment dimension 
includes six different rating scales or behavior 
checklists including the Bristol Social Adjustment 
Guides. 
Further, the user may choose to assess dimensional 
behavior on the basis of professional judgment instead of 
upon standardized instruments. Alternately, the user may 
choose to assess some dimensional behavior on the basis 
of professional judgment instead of upon standardized 
instruments. This option is available only on the 
dimensions of adaptive behavior and social-emotional 
adjustment. Under the adaptive behavior dimension, the 
user is asked to indicate whether the quality of the 
child's adaptive functioning is good, adequate, or 
deficient and to specify the methods used in reaching 
that conclusion. Possible methods include the 
professional judgment method, other, adaptive behavior 
indices, or both methods. If the quality of the behavior 
is considered to be deficient, the system will display 
the eight major areas of adaptive behavior recognized by 
the American Association on Mental Deficiency (Grossman, 
1977; 1983) and asks that the areas deemed deficient be 
indicated. These will be listed in the output narrative 
under the adaptive behavior dimension. If none of the 
eight major areas was indicated by the user then the 
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narrative will report only that adaptive behavior is 
deficient. 
Si mi larl y, under the social-emotional adjustment 
dimension , the user may choose to utilize "other" data 
input as an assessment of adjustment in this dimension. 
The user is asked to specify whether the quality of the 
child's current social-emotional adjustment is considered 
to be wel l adjusted, adequately adjusted, or maladjusted. 
The user must also specify the basis upon which the 
judgment was made, i.e. professional judgment, other 
measures o f social-emotional adjustment, or both methods . 
It is the intent of the program authors to refer to the 
other measures of social-emotional adjustment to apply to 
nonsystem- supported objective and projective personality 
instruments. When the social-emotional adjustment is 
considered to be maladjusted, the system asks the user to 
indi cate a primary type of maladjustment in terms of DSM-
III d i agnostic criteria. This however is optional and 
i nstead the user may choose the term "other" instead of 
one of the diagnostic descriptors. The final narrative 
will i nclude the DSM-III descriptor if entered and if not 
the narrative will read "nonspecific type" maladjustment. 
Next M- MAC presents the user with a selection menu for a 
secondary type maladjustment. The same options are 
available as for primary maladjustment and if no 
s econdary maladjustments are evident, then the user may 
enter "none" and the narrative will not report a 
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secondary type of maladjustment. 
When all of the requested information is entered 
into the system, the system will, within the span of less 
than five minutes, analyze the data according to both 
system defined and user defined parameters and generate 
several pages of narrative output. The narrative output, 
when studied and considered as part of the decision 
process functions as an interpretive software decision 
aid. 
See Appendix D for copies of output used in this 
study and Appendix C for specific information regarding 
options actually utilized to generate this output . 
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APPENDIX B 
case Data Provided to All Decision Maker Subjects 
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Decision makers in each level of the study received 
the data reproduced on the following pages. Those 
decision makers who received the interpretive software 
narrative also received this same case data in order to 
control for differences in data sources across the 
decision maker subjects. 
The case material was adapted from an actual case 
referred for psychological evaluation by a school 
psychologist. The author attempted to attain a fine 
balance between the need to maintain confidentiality of 
all child data and a concomitant need to maximize the 
generalizability of the study by using actual data 
sources that a school psychologist would typically have 
available prior to a diagnostic decision. Therefore all 
identifying information was changed as was some of the 
actual data in order to protect the confidentiality of 
the original child referred. However, much of the raw 
test and observational data was retained in a manner that 
maintains confidentiality and simultaneously provides a 
highly typical case on which to make a diagnostic 
decision. 
NAME : Child A 
GRADE 2 , att and i ng a publ ic •l•m•ntary achool 
c.o. a . : ll/ 2 6/ 7 8 
AGE: 8 yaar• 4 month• 
SEX: Mala 
CATE OF EVALUATION : 4/ 1/ 87 
PRI MARY LANGUAGE OR MODE OF COMMUNICATION: Engliah 
REASCN FCR REFERRAL AND ~ INFCR!>.TICJI: '!hi child hu t:.m'I 
a,q:,arian::inJ ac:adallic di!!ioJJ.ti• and daawtratirq inllpprcpr1ata 
clAMrOCD bahaviai:9 ainoe at laut h1a !irat grada yw,ar . 
Accord.in; to hi.a 111'.>thar ha WU tha ~ o! a naz:maJ. prw;nancy. 
cav.J.opmnt&l mil~ rapc,rt.«Uy wn within ram&l limits and ha hu 
a,q:,arian::ai no major~ or m:ilcal ~ . A h1atary o! poor 
lldlool -~ and ~~ to haw -=ctated tha 
di!!ic:ul.ti• ha haa t:.m'I e,cpari encirq altlnqh ._ ~ haw 
bean rota:! in th1a &rM o! cx:n::,arn tw:C'Jt.ly . An avaluaticrl rraa a child 
dilvalopmnt canter ..twn ha WU !iVII yw,&ra Old ind1c:ated that ha WU 
e,cpari an::inJ "Mri.OUII parc:,aptual ~· that ,... ~VII or 
pot&rltial l earning pro1,1... . ~ ha.lp CZ1 a ~ buia !or 
! in& lllCtar -ia- WU pr011i.dad in ldrdilrgartMI U ,_..~and 
l &ngl.l&ga IICViOM. lie !ailed to muter !irat grada ctrjactiwa and 
rei:-&ted tha first grade. 
sti.mJ.lant -1icati<Z1 haa t:.m'I prMCri.bad tor UN CZ1 a daily buia. Ilia 
current ~ raport that h1a cluarooa, bahaviars tend to vary 
aa:>::>ntirq to "1athllr or net ha hu rwoaJ.Vlld h1a m:ilcati<ZI. Ilia r.gular 
claas.roaa t.acher np:Jrta that >ohln tha -Ue&tiCZI 1a e!!actiVII ha tcm 
to do worlc ~ and liaten attantivaJ.y. llowlalrc", >twn ha hu nat 
taken i t or i t has net tak.en e!!ect hll tan:ls to • . •. oczm CZ! lilca 
gargbust.ara • •• " ra!Usirq to stay Matad or do h1a clasaworlt and "totall.Y" 
diuupts tha claaa . He 1a also deacri.bad as ba.ing rule to adults , 
retuses to follow di..r9c:ticns and samtimas ~ to ba "suilC'I and 
orqry . " ArDthar t.Mdlar deacri.bad hilll u an "ll!Dt.icnally diaturl:>ed, 
cxtr'l!lllely aansi tiw J.nilvidual 'o'llo 1a OIIU'IIC'ISitiw , rigid , and 
stul::tJorn • II 
Ila WU !Urthar deacri.bad by hia cl&SSI'OCIII taad>ar U "bright" and 
"l<no.ll adgeabla . • Acaclal!.ically ~ and written larquaga ald.lls an 
especi.all y di!! i c:ul. t !or h.im . Arithmetic par!armarc,a 1a ganenll y 
o!ldequata wi-- ha 1a abl• to attaro to iratructi<Z1. Ha I.a a cluarooa, 
1-.r and although ha e,cpari...,.. sam 1ntarpancnal di!!ic:ul.ti• with 
h.1a ~ hll 1a ~y lil<ad by thllm. 
BDiA VICFAL O!ISDU\TIOIS: 
'!?la cnild -a obaarVlld in hi.a cl&s5I'OCIII cllrirq a tima lohc'I tha taad>ar 
wu ~ with a -11 ~ gro.ip 1n ona comar or thll roam and thll 
aide wu IIVllilabl • to aaaiat tha other c:hildran ,.t,c wn cnrpletirq ...,t 
ass i gnments . He was trequ,antly rut or h1a Mat (pre!uwntial ...,tirq 
naar tha t.Mdlar'• da&k), axplorirq IIIOSt arau o! thll roam and ~ to 
l oaa hilllMlt within tha activity or thll J:uay cluara:111. Ha had worlc to 
do rut ~y rat'UNd to do it <ZI h1a cwn ~ !or ona two nuruta 
irrtarvaJ. ~ tha !orty-!i VII IIUl'l.lta oi:aarV&tiCZI lot>C'I hil lomkad quietly 
a, task . He t.enled to ignore verbal requmta to stay CZ! t.ask by bath the 
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interval during the forty-five ainute obeervation when h• worked quietly 
on taek , H• tended to ignore verbal raquaete to etay on ta•k by both the 
teacher and the aide, On two inetanc•• etaff aat dovn with hi• to •••i•t 
hi• with hi• work and on both occaaiona he worked cooperatively and 
appeared to be trying to do hi• beat . 
I n th• on• to one evaluation ••••ion h• praaented •• a generally 
cooperative individual variably aotiveted to do hi• beat in the taating . 
Affect waa poaitiva aero•• th• ••••ion and interperaonal akilla vera 
adequate for hi• age although he frequently burped for attentional 
purpo••• · He generally followed direction• but tended to teat the liait• 
of th• exaain•r and paaaively retuead •o•• taaka, out ot ••at behaviors 
var• coaaon . rira exaainar atructura vaa generally autticient to bring 
hi• back on taek each ti•• · Little overt anxiety vaa evident . He tandad 
to •talk" hi• vay through aany or th• taaka . So•• or th• viaual 
per ceptual ta•k• appeared to be aoaevhat contuaing tor hia. Although 
b• turned one ot th• Bander deaigna upaid• dovn becau•• b• could not 
" · · ••• it like that • • • • hi• actual copy or the deaign vae appropriataly 
aligned , He revaraed the color• in tvo out of hi• thr•• block deeign 
e r ror• and did not reali•• that th• color• var• ravereed until ••ntionad 
by the exaainer. 
TEST SCORES : 
WISC- RI VIQ 15 
I ntonati on 
Siailar ith• 
Arithmetic 
Vocabulary 
Coapreheneion 
Digit Span 
PIQ 100 
7 
FSIQ 91 
BENDER GESTALT : 
10 
9 
5 
7 
6 
J Koppitz developmental error•: 
4 Koppitz emotional indicator•: 
linea r ••cond attempt) 
WRAT- R: 
Standard Scoraa : Reading 64 
Picture Coapletion 15 
Picture Arrang•••nt 9 
Block Deeign 7 
Object A•••ably 10 
Coding 9 
(angulationr diaproportionr integration) 
(confu••d ordar r large aiza, reinforced 
Spelling 64 Arithmetic 6 7 
PROJECTIVE PERSONALITY TESTS: (TAT , Incomplat• Santancaa , Human figure 
Drawl nga, Kinetic Faaily Drawing) 
TAT themas : aajor th•••: aadne•• (in I out or 10 cards) with no overt 
peraonal action that turned into happina•• (5 cards) and aor• aadn••• 
. or death (J card•) I other thaaaa: aurpri•• , aggr•••ion, uncertainty 
I ncomplete aantancea: ahort abrupt action laden atatamanta 1 atrong 
••otional bond with faaily ••ab•r•r otharvi•• benign 
Dr awing• : KFD : each individual drawn ••parataly, .. doea not include 
••lf 1 HFD: noraal aiza r include• all davalopaantally expected feature• 
plua taeth in both figure• : female tac• ahadedr atory/ daacription : aala 
a year• oldr f•aal• 4 yeara ... both actively playing indoor• at home. 
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APPENDIX C 
M-MAC Options Utilized to Generate M-MAC 
output for Groups 2 & 3 
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The following user options were employed to generate 
the M-MAC narrative stimulus materials for psychologist 
subjects in Groups 2 and 3. 
MODE: Standard 
EXCEPTIONALITY LEVELS Not entered 
DATA SOURCES: 
INTELLECTUAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
ADAPTIVE 
SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL 
PRINT DSM-III & ICD-9 
DIAGNOSTIC 
CLASSIFICATIONS? 
WISC-R with all subtest scores 
entered 
WRAT-R with Reading, Spelling, & 
Arithmetic 
Omitted 
Omitted 
No for Group 2 
Yes for Group 3 
Note that the only difference between the data 
provided the Group 2 and Group 3 psychologists was that 
Group 3 psychologists received an M-MAC diagnostic 
classification and Group 2 subjects did not. See also 
Table 16. 
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APPENDIX D 
M-MAC Narrative Output Provided Groups 2 & 3 
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The psychologist subjects in Groups 2 and 3 received 
one of two variations of M-MAC narrative output. The 
narrative provided Group 2 subjects included everything on 
the next three pages with the exception of the "M-MAC 
CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY" at the end of the final page. 
Group 3 subjects received the next three pages as is; 
including the classification summary. 
Th• tolloving intoraation i• adapted !roa the 
NcDaraott Nultidi.Jlansional Aaaassaent ot Children 
Copyright 1985 
Th• Psychological Corporation 
RECORD DATE : 04 / 01/ 87 
METHODS : 
WECHS LER INTELLI GENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN - REVISED (WISC-R ) 
WI DE RANGE ACHIEVEMENT TESTS - REVISED (WRAT-R ) 
PROFES S I ONAL JUDGMENT REGARDING SOCIAL-EMOTI ONAL ADJUSTMENT 
UNS PECIFIED MEASURES OF SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT 
.•...•.........••....•...•••..••..••.•••••..•••••..•...•.................... 
I N T E L L E C T U A L F U N C T I O N I N G D I M E N S I O N 
WECHSLER I NTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN - REVISED (WIS C-R ) 
OBTAINED INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS 
95 \ 
CON FI DENCE PERFOR-
LIMIT VERBAL MANCE FULL SCALE 
85 10 0 91 
UPPER 9 3 109 97 
LOWER 77 9 1 85 
OBTAINED FACTOR DEVIATION QUOTIENTS 
9 5 1 
CONFI DEN CE VERBAL PERCEPTUAL FREEDOM FR 
LIMIT COMPREHEN . ORGANIZAT. DISTRACT . 
8 4 102 87 
UPPER 92 111 98 
LOWER 7 6 9 2 7 6 
ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE QUOTI ENTS: 
MAXIMUM OVERALL ESTIMATED PREVALENCE LEVEL FOR ACCEPTING 
ABNORMALI TY OF VERBAL-PERFORMANCE IQ DIFFERENCE• 6\ 
THE 15-POINT DI FFERENCE BETWEEN VERBAL AND PERFORMANCE SCALE QUOTI ENTS IS 
NOT SUFFICI ENTLY UNCOMMON TO BE CONSIDERED TO BE ABNORMAL , SINCE 
DIFFERENCES THIS LARGE MA'i OCCUR WITH AS MANY AS 251 OF CHILDREN WITH IN 
THE CHI LD'S AGE RANGE. SUCH A DIFFERENCE WOULD PRO BABLY REPRESENT A 
NATURAL VARIATION IN GENERAL- INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING . HOWEVER , THE 
DIFFERENCE IS SIGNIFICANT STATISTICALLY ( P< . 05 ) AND , THEREFOR!: , THE 
VERBAL I Q IS USED AS THE PRINCIPAL I NDICATOR OF THE CHILD'S CURRENT LEVEL 
OF I NTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING . 
ANALYSI S OF FACTO R SCORES: 
MAXIMUM PROBABILITY LEVEL FOR ACCEPTING STATISTI CAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF DIFFERENCES AMONG FACTOR DEVIAT ION QUOTI ENTS• . 15 
THE DEVIATION QUOTIENT FOR THE PERCEPTUAL ORGAN I ZATI ON FACTOR I S 
S IGN IFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT FOR THE VERBAL COMPREHENSION FACTOR 
( P< . 05) . THIS RESULT IS CONS I STENT WITH THE OBTAIN ED VERBAL-PERFORMANCE 
DISCREPANCY FAVORI NG THE PERFORMANCE SCALE IQ. 
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THE FREEDOM FROM DISTRACTIBILITY FACTOR QUOTIENT IS DEPRESSED SIGNIFICANTLY 
BELOW THAT FOR THE PERCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION FACTOR (P< . 15) . THIS MAY 
INDICATE THAT THE CHILD HAS COMPARATIVELY LESS ABILITY SUSTAINING ATTENTION 
IN CERTAIN PROBLEM SOLVING SITUATIONS, OR THAT THE CHILD IS SOMEWHAT LESS 
PROFICIENT IN RETAINING ANO COGNITIVELY MANIPULATING NUMERICAL DATA. THESE 
POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE STUDIED. 
LEVEL OF FUNCTIONING: 
CURRENTLY THE CHILO IS FUNCTIONING THE LOW AVERAGE LEVEL OF GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE (IO• 85) . THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBJECT TO ERROR VARIATION . 
HOWEVER , WITH 95\ CONFIDENCE, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO EXCEED THE c PPER 
LIMIT OF AN I O OF 9J OR LOWER LIMIT OF AN IO OF 77 . 
.••••.....•.......•••.•••.......•.••.•.•••••••.••.•.......•..•.•........•... 
A C A O E M I C A C H I E V E M E N T D I M E N S I O N 
WI DE RANGE ACHIEVEMENT TESTS - REVISED (WRAT-R) 
OBTAINED SUBSCALE SCORES 
951 
CONFIDENCE 
LIMIT READING SPELLING ARITHMETIC 
64 64 67 
UPPER 7l 72 80 
LOWER 57 56 54 
DEVIATION OF SUBSCALE SCORES FROM CHILD'S AVERAGE PERFORMANCE LEVEL 
AVERAGE• 65 
LEVEL OF 
PERFORM. READING 
>CHILD'S AVERAGE 
CHILD'S 
SCORE 
<CHILD'S AVERAGE 
64 
SPELLING ARITHMETIC 
64 67 
MAXIMUM PROBABILITY FOR ACCEPTING STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF DEVIATIONS FROM AVERAGE PERFORMANCE• . OS 
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EXPECTED, OBSERVED ACHIEVEMENT 
(REGRESSION ANALYSIS ) 
LEVEL OF 
ACHIEVEMNT . 
EXPECTED 
OBSERVED 
DISCREPANCY 
STAT . SIGN . 
EST . \ PREVALENCE 
COEFFICIENT 
READING 
90 
64 
- 26 
.0 001 
l 
. 68 
ARITHMETIC 
90 
67 
-2J 
.005 
2 
.69 
MAXIMUM OVERALL ESTIMATED PREVALENCE LEVEL FOR ACCEPTING 
ABNORMALITY or DISCREPANCY FROM EXPECTED ACHIEVEMENT • 61 
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READING : 
COMPARED TO THE AVERAGE PERFORMANCE or CHILDREN IN THE SAME AGE RANGE, THE 
CHILD 'S PRESENT ACHIEVEMENT IN READING IS AT THE MILDLY DEFICIENT LEVEL . 
THI S UVEL o r PERFORMANCE IS MARKEDLY DISCREPANT ( P< .0001 ) FROM 
EXP ECTANC Y BASED ON THE CHILD'S ESTIMATED INTELLECTUAL FUNCTI ONING , THUS 
IN DICAT:NG APPRECIABLE UNDERACHIEVEMENT IN READING . THIS DEGREE or 
UNDERACHIEVEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO OCCUR IN MORE THAN 1, or THE CHILD'S AGE 
PEERS . 
SPELLING: 
COMPARE D TO THE AVERAGE PERFORMANCE IF CHILDREN IN THE SAME AGE RANGE , THE 
CHILD'S PRESENT ACH I EVEMENT !N SPELLING IS AT THE MILDLY DEr:c:ENT LEVE: . 
AR ITHMET :C : 
COMPARED TO THE AVERAGE PERFORMANCE or CHILDREN IN THE SAME AGE RANGE, THE 
CHILD'S PRESENT ACHIEVEMENT IN ARITHMETIC IS AT THE MILDLY DEFICIENT 
LEVEL . THIS LEVEL or PERFORMANCE IS MARKEDLY DISCREPANT (P< .005) FROM 
EXPECTANC Y BASED ON THE CHILD'S EST I MATED INTELUCTUAL FUNCTIONING , THUS 
IND ICATING APPRECIABLE UNDERACHIEVEMENT IN ARITHMETIC . THIS DEGREE or 
UNDERACHIEVEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO OCCUR IN HORE THAN 2, or THE CHILD'S AGE 
PEERS . 
DIMENSION SLl'iMARY : 
ACADEMIC AREA 
READING 
SPELLI NG 
ARITHMETIC 
STATUS RELATIVE TO 
AGE RANGE 
MILDLY DEFICIENT 
MILDLY DEFICIENT 
MILDLY DEFICIENT 
STATUS RELATIVE TO 
INTELLECTUAL FUNCT. 
UNDERACHIEVEMENT 
UNDERACHIEVEMENT 
**************************************************************************** 
•••••..•••••...••••..•.......•.•...••.•.•••..••...•..••.......•.........•.•. 
M-M AC C L A S S I F I C A T I O N S U M M A R Y 
DESCRIPT ION 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
RELATED DSM-III 
LOW AVERAGE INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING 
MIXED LEARNING DISABILITY (PROVISIONAL) ) 15.50 
•.• ....•......•..••.•••..................................................... 
**************************************************************************** 
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APPENDIX E 
Cover Letter 
Deer 
00000 
THE LNVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION 
.), v, llOn ot 11u1"1Qn ono Commun, , , .?esou,c •1 
Cou-o- Port, MQ,....,onc 20i J ] 
:ovns.e""O o.,.:, °'-' '°"ne' Se,,v,ce 1 
JC· , .! 5-'· 2:.t: 
· O•cellber l, 1987 
I .. vriting to you to reque•t approxiaetely twenty ainut•• ot your 
aaaiatance and expertiae . I..., a doctoral candidate in achool paychology 
intereated in the achool paychologiat•a daciaion-aeking proceaa. 
I have encloaed data relevant to a achool-baaed ca•• retarred tor 
paychological evaluation in order to aa•i•t in th• d•t•raination ot the 
child'• eligibility tor •pecial educational ••rvic••· 
Pl •••• review the ca•• data and decide whathar th• child i• educationally 
handicapped. It handicapped, please indicate th• primary handicapping 
condition . 
Enter your daci•ion on the enclo••d (blue) sheet ot paper . A.fill you have 
made your deciaion, open the blue sheet and anawer the tiva ahort 
queation• that requaat primarily demographic intormation. I have 
ancloaed a aalt-addr••••d atampad envelope tor your reply as wall as a 
stamped poatal card that I raquaat that you mail as wall . All rasponaas 
will be anonymoua . I anticipate completing the data analysis no later 
than April, 1988 and will be happy to aand copi•• ot my tindinga to tho•• 
intareated . 
Thank you in advance tor your cooperation. It i• my hop• that the data 
collected herein will contribute to an incr••••d und•r•tanding ot the 
•chool paychologiat' • deci•ion process and that thi• project will be ot 
intere•t to you. 
Sinir•ly, . 
/ \, \ L{_ C .. ,_ L 1, \,._ 
Jo1l W. Wisor, M.A . 
Scho~P•ychologi•t 
~ I • 
,, ,J~ . 
,, , f't""-'"' ......  __ 
Will aa Strain, O. Ed. 
A••ociata Prot•••or 
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APPENDIX F 
Decision/Response Sheet 
144 
There were three separate versions of the response form 
on the next page; one for each subject group. The 
variations occur only on the question beginning "To what 
extent were the following sources of information ..•. " Group 
1 subjects were asked to indicate degree of influence from 
among reason for referral, background information, 
observations, and test data only. Group 2 subjects were 
given these data sources, plus the M-MAC statistics and M-
MAC narrative to respond to. Group 3 subjects were 
additionally provided the data •ource of M-MAC 
classification . See also Table 16. 
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1 
PLDSE ENI'ER YWR CECLSI CllS BEI.J::Jol . 
00 001' UNSt\PIE 'lHLS SHEET UNI'IL YCU HAVE ENr= YCXlR CfX:I.SictlS. 
What is thll prct,abili ty that thll c:hlld is: (Ci.rel• thll paroent:age that best n,present.s yoor estilllati a, tor~ catAigory below.) 
~ Disabl ed Ol--251--501--751--lOOI 
r..earng,g Disabled 01--2s1--so1--1s1--100, 
~ r y ~a,ally Di.5turt>ed g:==m==~g:==m==rng: 
Not Educilt.J.onally llahdicapped 01--2s1--so1--1s1--1001 
Now that you have checked o!! your diagnoatic decision , please answer the 
!ollowing questione . 
Did you uae any reaource or re!erence materials aa you were making the 
diagnostic decision you juat made? YES ___ NO __ _ 
I ! you answered Y•• to the 
what kind o! resource that 
TEXTBOOK 
previous queation, please check 
you uaed . 
OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE --COLLEAGUE __ _ 
OTHER __ :-- SOFTWARE TITLE.::::::: _____ _ 
To what extent were the !ollowing aourc•• o! in!or,nation in!luential in 
the d i agnosti c deciaion you just made? Circle the number which re!lects 
the i n!luenc• o! each o! the sourc••· 
REASON FOR REFERRAL 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
OBSERVATIONS 
TEST DATA 
NO MODERATE MUCH 
INFLUENCE INFLUENCE INFLUENCE 
1-----------2-----------3-----------•-----------s 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------•-----------s 
How long have you been a practicing (school ) paychologiat? 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR 2-5 YEARS 
6-10 YEARS __ -- OVER 10 YEARS __ 
To what extent have you used computer• o! any type in your current 
pro!easional (not recreational) practice? Circle tha applicable number . 
WORD PROCESSING 
REPORT WRITING 
TEST SCORING 
TEST INTERPRETATION 
CASE MANAGEMENT 
COUNSELING/ THERAPY 
OTHER 
NO SOME FREQUENT 
USE USE USE 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-------- - - - 5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-- ---------5 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
1----- ------2----------- 3-----------4----------- 5 
1-----------2-----------J-----------4-----------s 
Thank you !or taking the time to participate in this study. There is 
space !or any collllllenta you might have on the other side o! this sheet . 
When you have !iniahed pleaae place thi• sheet into the anclosed sel!-
addressed and atamped envelope and mail it . The salt-addressed and 
stamped postcard should also be mailed separately . I! you des i re a copy 
o! the results o! this study , please mark the appropriate space on the 
postcard as wel l . 
Thank you again !or your valuable assistance and pat i enc e . 
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APPENDIX G 
Response Permutations Provided by Subjects 
to the Series of Questions: 
"What is the Probability that the Child is ... ?" 
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Each subject was asked to make a probability 
estimate for each of the handicapping/nonhandicapping 
conditions. The entries that follow is the entire set of 
permutations of the probability judgments made by the 
subjects. The handicapping condition of "Mentally 
Retarded" was considered to have a probability of 0% in 
each permutation and was therefore omitted from this 
list. 
LD1 NEH2 SED3 LANG4 
75 25 25 0 
7 5 25 25 75 
50 25 25 25 
75 0 0 0 
75 25 0 25 
75 25 25 25 
50 75 25 25 
75 25 0 12 
0 75 0 0 
50 0 50 0 
25 0 0 25 
100 0 0 25 
75 0 50 25 
100 0 25 50 
75 0 50 50 
75 50 12 50 omit5 
1 00 75 0 0 omit 
75 0 0 50 
100 0 25 25 
75 0 25 25 
100 0 50 75 
25 0 50 25 
50 0 25 25 
75 25 25 50 
75 25 50 25 
75 0 25 0 
50 100 25 50 omit 
100 25 0 25 
50 50 25 50 
75 0 0 25 
75 0 0 75 
50 25 25 50 
50 25 25 75 
25 75 75 25 omit 
75 
25 
25 
25 
75 
0 
75 
100 
100 
100 
25 
75 
75 
25 
75 
50 
87 
50 
75 
7 5 
25 
50 
0 
50 
75 
25 
50 
75 
0 
75 
0 
75 
0 
100 
25 
25 
0 
0 
25 
50 
0 
0 
0 
100 
25 
0 
50 
0 
25 
50 
25 
25 
50 
75 
25 
0 
25 
0 
50 
50 
0 
50 
12 
0 
25 
25 
50 
0 
0 
25 
50 
75 
lLD indicates "Learning Disabled." 
25 
25 
25 
25 
75 
0 
50 
75 
75 
0 
0 
50 
100 
75 
50 
25 
50 
75 
0 
75 
50 
50 
0 
25 
omit 
omit 
omit 
omit 
omit 
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2NEH indicates "Not educationally handicapped." 
3SED indicates "Seriously emotionally disturbed." 
4 LANG indicates "Language disabled." 5omit indicates that this is one of the permutations 
whose meaning was uninterpretable and therefore omitted 
from the data analysis. 
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